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ABSTRACT 
This thesis critically examines the origins and development of international criminal law 
to identify the defining features of this emerging legal tradition. It critically evaluates the 
experimental approach taken in Article 21 of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, which attempts to codify an untested normative super-structure to guide 
this legal tradition. 
International criminal law is a hybrid tradition which seeks legitimacy and answers to 
difficult questions by drawing on other established legal traditions. Its development at the 
confluence of public international law, international humanitarian law, international 
human rights law and national criminal laws has resulted in gaps in difficult cases with no 
clear answers. These lacunae have been filled by recourse to judicial discretion, 
exercised consistent with Patrick Glenn's the ory of transnational common laws, and by 
privileging one of the competing aims of international criminal law: enhancing 
humanitarian protection versus maximizing fairness to the accused. 
1V 
ABRÉG É 
Cette thèse porte un regard critique sur les origines et le développement du droit pénal 
international afin de mieux cerner les éléments caractéristiques de cette tradition juridique 
émergente. Il s'agit d'une évaluation critique de l'approche expérimentale proposée par 
l'Article 21 du Statut de Rome de la Cour Pénale Internationale, qui vise à codifier une 
superstructure normative innovante afin de mieux asseoir cette tradition juridique. 
Le droit pénal international est une tradition hybride qui cherche une légitimité et qui 
cherche à apporter des réponses à des questions complexes en s'inspirant d'autres 
traditions juridiques établies. Son développement à la confluence du droit international 
public, du droit international humanitaire, des droits de l'homme et des législations 
pénales nationales, a abouti dans certains cas à un vide juridique et des réponses 
imprécises. Ces lacunes ont été comblées par le recours au pouvoir de discrétion 
judiciaire, exercé selon la théorie de droit communs transnationaux avancée par Patrick 
Glenn. Elles ont également été comblées en privilégiant l'un des deux objectifs mis en 
concurrence par le droit pénal international, à savoir privilégier la protection humanitaire 
ou renforcer le droit de l'accusé à un procès équitable. 
v 
INTRODUCTION 
International criminal law has only recently emerged as an independent field of study, 
practiced by few but closely watched by many. Today, the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) is an ambitious project that raises complex questions that legal practitioners and 
scholars are only beginning to appreciate. While the path towards a permanent 
international criminal court was long, the haste with which the Rome Statute creating the 
ICC was negotiated leaves lingering concerns about whether this infant institution will be 
able to achieve the loft y aims of its framers. Foundational to the legitimacy and viability 
of this judicial institution is the way that it recognizes, interprets and applies norms and 
rules in the still developing area of international criminallaw. 
This thesis aIms to critically examme the historical ongms and contemporary 
development of international criminal law to identify the defining features of this 
emergent legal tradition, and to evaluate the new approach taken in Article 21 of the 
Rome Statute of the ICC in attempting to codify a normative super-structure to guide this 
legal tradition moving forward. This inquiry involves the most practical of substantive, 
procedural and evidentiary issues, as weIl as the most theoretical questions related to the 
nature of law and judicial decision-making. 
It will be argued that international criminallaw is a hybrid tradition in which the constant 
tension between divergent sources of law are resolved in difficult cases not by resorting to 
well-established doctrines of public international law as often claimed, but rather by 
judicial discretion. This discretion is often exercised in a manner which is consistent with 
Patrick Glenn' s theory of transnational common laws which posits that persuasive, non-
1 
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binding norms that transcend national laws operate in the background and may be drawn 
upon to address gaps in applicable law. This thesis will further argue that one of the 
principal persuasive reasons for opting to follow one transnational common law over 
another is based on favoring one of the fundamental tensions in the international criminal 
law tradition (e.g. humanitarian protection versus fairness to the accused). In the final 
analysis, it will be submitted that Article 21 of the Rome Statute, which purports to define 
'applicable law' for resolving questions of international criminallaw, carries the serious 
risk of being indeterminate, and inconsistently applied by authorizing the possibility of 
different norms applying to different accused - a troubling concept in criminal 
proceedings. It also opens the door wide open to judicial activism in ways not fully 
appreciated by the negotiators of the Rome Statute who generally intended to limit the 
scope of judge-made law in comparison to the legacy and modern ad hoc tribunals. 
In Chapter 1, the origins of the international criminallaw tradition will be explored up to 
the end of the post-WWII period. This analysis will focus on how this tradition has 
struggled to define its sources of law and methods of interpretation, as weIl as the impact 
of institutional design on the development of this tradition. Some of the early defining 
features of this tradition will be identified so that their growth or decline may be more 
fully understood as the tradition's progress is tracked. 
Chapter 2 will critically examine the development of the international criminal law 
tradition at the modern ad hoc tribunals: the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). 
The ability of these tribunals to identify applicable sources of law in difficult cases, and to 
2 
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deal with fundamental tensions in this legal tradition, will be examined. An analysis of 
the jurisprudence of these tribunal s, where gaps in the applicable law have arisen, will be 
undertaken in order to identify the theoretical means by which this legal tradition has 
sought to reconcile competing sources of law from different legal traditions. Patrick 
Glenn' s theory of transnational common laws will be introduced as offering a persuasive 
explanatory the ory for the actual operation of judicial decision-making in difficult cases 
before these tribunals. 
Finally, Chapter 3 will apply these historical and contemporary insights to the applicable 
lawand institutional design of the ICC as the first permanent international criminal court 
and sustainer of this legal tradition moving forward. For the first time in history, Article 
21 of the Rome Statute of the ICC purports to delimit the sources of international criminal 
law in an international treaty. The provision is not the progeny of the common law, 
civilian or public international law traditions entirely, despite drawing sorne inspiration 
from them. Rather, it is an untested and theoretically incoherent new articulation ofwhat 
law is and how it may be found. As with any legal order, Article 21 claims to offer an 
answer to questions that are not addressed in formaI legal sources (i.e. the Rome Statute, 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Elements of Crime, and relevant treaties). Given that 
the ICC is an adjudicative body without a complete code to apply, there must be answers 
to questions unaddressed in these formaI sources - but where do they come from, and 
how will judges go about finding them? Does Article 21 of the Rome Statute pro vide a 
sufficient basis for determining practical matters that will come before the ICC, and, more 
fundamentally, does it provide an underlying structure for an international criminal law 
tradition? These are the questions that this final analysis will aim to address. They have 
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far reaching implications for the future of international criminal law and its promise to 
seek justice for serious violations of international humanitarian law. 
4 
CHAPTER 1 
Origins of the International Criminal Law Tradition: Post-WWII 
Crimes against international law are committed f?y men, not f?y abstract 
entities, and on!J f?y punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the 
provisions of internationallaw be enforced. 
- Judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, 19461 
Understanding the genesis of international criminal law is important for several reasons. 
First, it offers insights into why such a tradition became possible in the course of human 
history. Secondly, it demonstrates why this tradition has struggled to define its sources of 
law and methods of interpretation - a fundamental challenge which still troubles it today. 
Finally, it shows how the institutional structure in which international criminal law 
developed was sufficient to bring it into existence, but inadequate to provide for its 
ongoing normative application until subsequent historical events again made it necessary 
to nurture this infant tradition. 
Before the Tradition Emerged 
For thousands ofyears, customary rules have regulated the means and methods ofwarfare 
in various parts of the world. With only the rarest of exceptions, violations of such rules 
have been tried before national courts or military tribunals,2 applying national 
1 United States of America et al. v. Hermann Wilhelm Goring et al., Trials of the Major War Criminals 
Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 1, Judgement: The Law of 
the Charter, online: Avalon Project <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalonlimt/proc/judlawch.htm> [IMT 
Judgement]. 
2 Richard May & Marieke Wierda, International Criminal Evidence (Ardsley, NY: Transnational 
Publishers, 2002) at 3 [May & Wierda, 2002]. The exception here is the trial of von Hagenbach in 1474 
who was tried for violating that 'laws of God and man' by twenty-eight judges from 'allied towns': see 
5 
Otigins of the International Ctiminal Law Tradition 
substantive, procedural and evidentiary law. The laws of war were largely seen as 
directed to the parties of such conflicts and, in the Westphalian system, specifically to 
States themselves as opposed to individuals. Gradually, individual military officiaIs and 
sol di ers could theoretically be held accountable for violating such laws, often due to 
codification in national military codes and manuals. The need to ensure discipline in 
professional armies offered a strong impetus for such practices, rather than the 
humanitarian concerns which would come to a fore during the bloody conflicts of the 
nineteenth century. Many generals of this era, however, like Field-Marshal-General 
Count von Moltke, disputed the enforceability of the rules of international humanitarian 
law at the internationallevel: 
Every law presupposes an authority to superintend and direct its execution, and 
international conventions are supported by no such authority. What neutral States would 
ever take up arms for the sole reason that, two Powers being at war, the 'laws ofwar' had 
been violated by one or both of the belligerents? For offences of that sort there is no 
earthly judge[.]3 
Indeed, before 1945, "violations of international law and State practices during warfare 
were mainly dealt with by either military tribunals, which possessed limited jurisdiction, 
or in exceptional cases, by domestic courtS.,,4 . 
The widespread ratification of several international treaties late in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries which codified, in part, and also further developed customary 
ibid, nA. See Jordan 1. Paust, "History ofInternational Tribunals Prior to Nuremberg: Selective History of 
International Tribunals and Efforts Prior to Nuremberg" (2003) 10 ILSA 1. Int'l & Comp. L. 207 at 207-
209. 
3 Field-Marshal-General Count von Moltke in a letter to Professor 1.K. Bluntschli, Il December 1880, 
Holland, Letters on War and Neutrality (1914) at 25 cited in Sheldon Glueck, War Criminals: Their 
Prosecution & Punishment (New York: Alred A. Knopf, 1944) at 2 [emphasis added]. 
4 Claire de Than & Edwin Shorts, International Criminal Law and Human Rights (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2003) at 271 [de Than & Shorts]. 
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international humanitarian law,5 provided an internationally accepted normative 
framework that would only later be called upon, in conjunction with the peace treaties of 
the inter-World War period, as the substantive law foundation of an international criminal 
law tradition. Writing in 1944, Sheldon Glueck described this body of norms "as yet as 
undeveloped as was the early English common law.,,6 
While an international criminallaw tradition had not yet emerged prior to 1945, it can be 
seen as the descendent of two conventionally distinct systems of law. Cherif Bassiouni 
describes international criminal law as the "convergence of the international aspects of 
municipal criminal law and the criminal aspects of international law. Its origin and 
emergence must, therefore, be traced through these two branches of law, even though it is 
emerging as a discipline in its own right.,,7 According to Bassiouni, this has given 
international criminal law a '''split personality' which has plagued its development".8 
Sorne of these tensions are clear from an account of the aborted attempt to bring 
international criminallaw into existence in the wake of the brutality of World War 1. 
A False Start at Leipzig 
5 For an extensive list of such sources, from the Resolutions of the Geneva International Conference, 
Geneva, 26-29 October 1863 to The Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907, see 
International Committee of the Red Cross, "Treaties and Documents by Date", online: ICRC 
<http://www.icrc.org>. For adoption in national military manuals, see, e.g., Instructionsfor the Government 
of Armies of the United States in the Field, 24 April 1863, online: ICRC <http://www.icrc.org> [Lieber 
Code]; Prussia (Kingdom), War Book of the German General Staff(Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 
2005), translated by J.H. Morgan, originally published in 1915. 
6 Glueck, supra note 3 at 98. 
7 M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Criminal Law: A Draft International Criminal Code (Germantown, 
MY: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980) at 2 [Bassiouni, 1980]. 
8 Ibid at 19. 
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The emergence of an international criminallaw tradition got a false start after World War 
1. To begin with, there was sharp disagreement among the Allied powers, which hailed 
from a diversity of legal traditions themselves, about what law an international tribunal 
should apply to prosecute German officiaIs for their conduct during the war, and whether 
individuals could even be prosecuted for violations of the laws of war by an international 
tribunal. 
The Commission on the Responsibility of the Authon, of the War and on Enforcement of 
Penalties (Commission)9 recommended that an international tribunal prosecute WWI war 
criminals and apply "the principles of the law of nations as they result from the usages 
established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and from the dictates of 
public conscience."lO lronically, the Japanese delegation (then a member of the Allies) 
challenged the entire exercise of putting individuals who violated the laws of war on trial 
at an, asking "whether international law recognizes a penal law as applicable to those 
who are guilty."ll 
The Martens Clause as a Source rif International Criminal Law 
9 The Commission members were Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Poland, Romania, Serbia, United 
Kingdom, United States: Paust, supra note 2 at 208. 
10 Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, (1920) 14 
Am. J. Int. L. 95 at 122 [WWI Commission] cited in Glueck, supra note 3 at 22. 
Il WWI Commission, supra note 10 cited in Glueck, supra note 3 at 23. Subsequently after WWII at the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (lMTFE) trial, only Judge Pal (India) "would have acquitted 
aIl the defendants on the ground that there had been no individual criminal responsibility under 
internationallaw": Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, International Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001) at 20. 
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By referring to the 'laws of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience', the 
post-WWI Commission was indirectly attempting to incorporate the Martens Clause, 
named after the Russian delegate who first proposed it at the Hague Peace Conference in 
1899, as an independent source oflaw. The Martens Clause stated: 
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties 
think it right to de clare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, 
populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of 
international law, as they result from the usages established between civilized nations, 
from the laws of hum an ity and the requirements of public conscience. 12 
Theodor Meron has described the Martens Clause as having "originated as supplementary 
or residual protection, based on sources of morality and law, pending a comprehensive 
codification of the laws of war.,,13 As international humanitarian law became 
increasingly codified, the Martens Clause was recognized as a "powerful vehicle" for 
advancing humanitarian concerns, enabling the "dynamic development" of international 
humanitarian law, which made "clear that written humanitarian law could develop only 
gradually and to show there was a common law that must be respected.,,14 
However, after WWI, the D.S. rejected the Martens Clause as a source of international 
criminallaw. While the American representative to the Commission was willing to hold 
individuals responsible for violations of the laws and customs of war at the international 
level, he issued a reservation rejecting the Martens Clause as a source of law to be 
applied, stating: "the laws and customs of war are a standard certain to be found in books 
of authority and in the practice of nations. The laws and principles of humanity vary with 
12 Cited in Theodor Meron, "The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and Dictates of Public 
Conscience" (2000) 94 Amer. J. Int'l L. 78 at 79 [emphasis added]. 
13 Ibid at 79 [emphasis added]. 
14 Ibid at 81,86,88 [emphasis added]. 
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the individual, which, if for no other reason, should exclude them from consideration in a 
court of justice, especially one charged with the administration of criminallaw."l5 This 
statement reveals two paradoxical assumptions that still underlie international criminal 
law: the need for liberal enforcement of humanitarian norms on one hand, and the 
requirement of a fair trial on the other. lndeed, this early controversy surrounding the 
Martens Clause as a source of international criminallaw has continued to the present day, 
such that "[g]overnments are not yet ready to transform broad principles of humanity and 
dictates of public conscience into binding law."l6 For example, the V.S. Department of 
Army has stated that the Martens Clause is "in reality a reliance upon moral law and 
public opinion."l7 However, as will be seen in Chapter 2, the Martens Clause has played 
a role in extending humanitarian protection at the modem ad hoc tribunals. 
The significance of discarding the Martens Clause as a source of international criminal 
law at this point in history has had several implications for this emerging tradition. First, 
it has meant that the substantive body of norms in this tradition exhibited a strong 
tendency towards positivism. Secondly, the participants in generating norms within the 
tradition are largely States, as opposed to individuals or other non-State actors including 
non-State belligerents, non-governmental organizations, and so on. Third, since the 
Martens Clause embodies decidedly progressive humanitarian ideals that would have 
broadened the scope of substantive criminal liability, its questionable place in 
international criminal law signaIs a tendency towards the criminal law lineage within 
15 WWI Commission, supra note 10 cited in Glueck, supra note 3 at 22. 
16 Meron, supra note 12 at 88. 
17 Ibid. at 88. 
10 
Origins of the International Criminal Law Tradition 
international criminallaw. Finally, although formally rejected as an independent source 
of law, the Martens Clause continues to have sorne normative force, affecting beliefs 
about change in the international criminal law tradition by extending liability to more 
gradually enhance humanitarian protection. As will be discussed later in Chapter 3, 
similar issues have arisen with international human rights law being indirectly,18 and now 
directly infused in Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute of the ICC, to progressively change 
the international criminal law tradition, undermining positivism and State-control of this 
tradition. 
Existing Traditions Entrenched: National Trials under National Law 
When it became clear that international trials of WWI war criminals did not have the 
support of the German authorities, despite their obligations under the Treaty of 
Versailles,19 the Allies agreed to assist with domestic prosecutions by German authorities 
at Leipzig. In preparing these cases for trial, the United Kingdom reportedly prepared 
cases against accused they had named according to English standards of proof and 
evidence. Observing this phenomenon, commentators have stated "why the highly 
technical rules of evidence and standards of proof required in Anglo-American jury trials 
were deemed necessary in view of the fact that the accused were to be tried in German 
courts, under German law, and before appraisers of fact who where not laymen but 
trained jurists, is not clear.,,2o In the end, the Criminal Senate of the Reich Court of 
Justice at Leipzig applied the German Military Penal Code and Reich Penal Code in 
18 See Richard May & Marieke Wierda, "Trends in International Criminal Evidence: Nuremberg, Tokyo, 
The Hague, and Arusha" (1999) 37 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 725 at 732-3, 764 [May & Wierda, 1999]. 
19 Treaty a/Versailles, 28 June 1919, arts. 227-8 reproduced in Paust, supra note 2 at 211. 
20 Glueck, supra note 3 at 31. 
11 
Origins of the International Cri minaI Law Tradition 
trying twelve accused (convicting six of them) from the originallist of 896 submitted for 
prosecution by the Allies?1 These questionable prosecutions based on nationallaw in a 
national court meant that the potential advent of an international criminal law tradition 
was delayed, if only for a brief time, until even larger-scale horrors during war would 
renew the caU for its birth. 
Nuremberg as the 'Birth Certificate' of International Criminal Law 
Heiko Ahlbrecht has called the Nuremberg Charter, signed by the Allied powers in 1945 
and subsequently endorsed by nineteen other States,22 the "birth certificate of 
international criminal law".23 The characterization is not an exaggeration, since the 
Nuremberg Charter meant that "for the first time individuals were held accountable, not 
only for specific war infringements contrary to international humanitarian law, but also 
for conduct amounting to crimes against humanity. AIso, for the first time precise 
definitions, in so far as it was possible to do so, were set out".24 Indeed, after the 
International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg had rendered its judgments, the U.N. 
General Assembly adopted Resolution 95(1) on Il December 1946 which affirmed "the 
principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and 
21 Ibid. at 28. Nevertheless, there was limited reference by the German court to violations "of the law of 
nations" in their judgments: ibid., at 104. 
22 In addition to Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the United States, the Nuremberg Charter was 
endorsed by Australia, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, India, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Poland, Uruguay, Venezuela and 
Yugoslavia: Kittichaisaree, supra note Il at 18. 
23 Heiko Ahlbrecht, "Foundations" in Gerhard Werle, ed., Principles of International Criminal Law (The 
Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2005) 1 at 6. 
24 de Than & Shorts, supra note 4 at 273. 
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the judgment of the Tribunal".25 Others have not been so gracious in their description, 
calling the Nuremberg proceedings "an experiment, almost an improvisation.,,26 
However, a historical analysis ofthe IMT and Control Council Law No. 1027 proceedings 
shows that the formallaw set out in their constituting statutes failed to sufficiently delimit 
the minimally required sources of law to be relied upon. As a result, the early 
development of international criminallaw was stunted and lacked coherence. Contrary to 
sorne academic commentary,28 these post-WWII tribunals concerned themselves with 
more than just American criminallaw, although it was very prominent. While U.S. law 
featured heavily and was the basis for including conspiracy as a mode of liability in the 
Nuremberg Charter, Soviet positions on international humanitarian law were also 
important in sorne areas, as were civilian approaches to evidentiary matters. In answering 
questions unaddressed in the formaI law of the IMT and Control Council Law No. 10 
Military Tribunals, resort was frequently had to the common law, such as articulating 
fundamental rights of the accused in Farben, discussed below. However, there are 
instances in which such open legal questions were resolved by considering common law 
and civilian systems alike (as in Krupp regarding trials in absentia of mentally 
incapacitated accused, discussed below), and German military law (as in Einsatzgruppen, 
discussed below). In at least one case, however, Defence Counsel was ridiculed for 
25 Affirmation of the Principles of International Law recognized by the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal, 
GA Res. 95(I), Il December 1946. 
26 Richard Overy, "The Nuremberg Trials: International Law in the Making" in Philippe Sands, ed., From 
Nuremberg to The Hague: The Future of International Criminal Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003) 1 at 2. 
27 The Nuremberg system encompassed both the IMT and other subsequent Military Tribunals acting under 
Allied Control Council Law No. 10, which tried lesser Nazi war criminals. 
28 Kittichaisaree, supra note Il at 44. 
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relying on the domestic criminallaw of the Allied powers in aid of their Nazi defendants 
(as in Einsatzgruppen, discussed below). 
An International Criminal Trial without an International Criminal Law 
Putting Axis war criminals on trial before an international tribunal was first seriously 
advanced at the Allies' Moscow Conference in 1943.29 Before the signing of the London 
Agreement and Nuremberg Charter in 1945, there was debate in the legal community as 
to whether and on what basis Axis war criminals could be tried by an international 
tribunal. Given that State responsibility is the usual me ans to enforce public international 
law, this body of law contained no obvious rules to be applied in the criminal prosecution 
of individuals for violations of it. 
With respect to substantive law, while international humanitarian law proscribed certain 
me ans and methods of warfare, which of these should entail individual criminal 
responsibility? What modes of liability were possible (e.g. in addition to individual 
perpetration and command responsibility, what of aiding and abetting, incitement, 
conspiracy, complicity, etc.)? Was an inquisitorial or adversarial mode of trial to be used? 
What rules of procedure and evidence were to be applied given that the major legal 
traditions of the world varied widely? Who would be the judges or jury and in what 
structure of court system? How can there be an international judiciary without an 
29 However, as late as October 1944, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill suggested that "it should not 
be assumed that the procedure of trial will necessarily be adopted": Glueck, supra note 3 at 10 [emphasis 
added]. During the war, British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, reiterated the calI for summary execution 
of the se Nazi leaders, stating: "The guilt of such individuals is so black that they faIl outside and go beyond 
the scope ofany judicial process": Overy, supra note 26 at 3. In the end, however, strange bedfeIlows of 
'Soviet lawyers and American liberals', raIlying around their new leader, President Harry Truman, lobbied 
the support needed for the Nuremberg trials to take place: ibid, at 5. 
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international legislature? Is a less recognizable, non-formaI law-making function 
possible? These and many more questions had no easy answers, and continue to haunt 
international criminallaw. 
Sheldon Glueck, in a wartime publication entitled War Criminals: Their Prosecution & 
Punishment, argued in 1944 that Nazi war criminals should not be tried under national 
law before national courts given the failure of this approach after WWI, but by an 
international tribunal applying "the laws and customs of legitimate warfare and of the 
criminal law co mm on to the civilized world"?O This articulation is similar to general 
public international law sources, codified in 1922 by the League of Nations in Article 
38(3) of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice which refers to 
"general principles of law recognized by civilized nations".31 However, as discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 3, the international criminal law tradition has adapted this concept, 
making it much more flexible, to suit its purposes and circumstances. Indeed, Glueck' s 
concept of 'common criminal laws' continues to be of lasting theoretical value to the 
development of international criminal law. Unfortunately, a critical analysis of the 
Nuremberg Charter as weIl as the proceedings, decisions and judgments of the IMT and 
Control Council Law No. 10 tribunals demonstrate that relying on common criminallaws 
did not generally take place. 
30 Glueck, supra note 3 at 35 [emphasis added]. 
31 Permanent Court of International Justice, Statute of the Court, Series D, No. 1, 13 December 1920 
(Leyden: A.W. Sijthoffs Publishing Company, 1926), art. 38(3). Subsequently, see also International Court 
of Justice, Statute of the International Court of Justice in LC.J. Acts and Documents, No. 5: Charter, Statute 
and Rules of Court (1978) and other Documents, art. 38(1)(c), online: ICJ <http://www.icj-
cij .orglicjwww /ibasicdocuments/ibasictextlibasicstatute.htm> [1 CJ Statute]. 
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National Influences in Formai Nuremberg Law 
The IMT held that the Nuremberg Charter "is decisive, and binding upon the Tribunal".32 
As a result, it refused to seriously question the legality of various offences over which it 
had jurisdiction. It is significant that this tradition of treating an enabling statute as 
having a constitutional status has been replicated by subsequent international tribunal s, 
such that "[ e ]ach international criminal tribunal interprets the law in accordance with the 
instrument creating the tribunal itself.,,33 With respect to the substantive law embodied in 
the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters, both inc1uded modes of liability such as conspiracy 
"even before the concept was received, under different aspects in civilist legal systems. 
At that time, it was due to American influence in the framing of the statutes of the IMT 
and IMTFE".34 Indeed, during the preparatory work on the Nuremberg Charter, the 
French delegation argued against inc1uding conspiracy as a mode of liability, calling it "a 
barbarous concept unworthy of modem law", and the Soviet delegation "was outright 
shocked at the concept of conspiracy". 35 
While it has been only rarely acknowledged, the Soviets also played a major role in 
shaping the Nuremberg Charter. Recent historical accounts suggest that Soviet positions 
on the emerging international criminal law tradition are still with us today, inc1uding: 
superior / command responsibility, hostage taking as a war crime, and the crime of 
32 IMT Judgement, supra note 1 at Judgement: The Law of the Charter. 
33 Kittiehaisaree, supra note Il at 44. 
34 M. CherifBassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers 
Ine., 2003) at 8, n. 27 [Bassiouni, 2003]. 
35 Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovié, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Appeals Transeript, 26 May 1997, pp. 15-17 
cited in Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovié, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint and Separate Opinion of Judge 
MeDonald and Judge Vohrah, Appeals Chamber, 7 Oetober 1997, para. 46 [Erdemovié, Judges MeDonald 
and Vohrah]. 
16 
/ 
Origins of the International Criminal Law Tradition 
waging aggressive war36 (revived in Article 5(1)( d) of the Rome Statute of the ICC, but 
still awaiting coming into force). FormaI Nuremberg law, therefore, varied in several 
important ways from common criminallaws as advocated by Glueck, discussed above. 
Partial judicialArticulation of Sources of Law 
The Nuremberg Charter itself did not include a provision on applicable law that the IMT 
was to apply in its proceedings. This approach was similarly adopted in the statutes of 
subsequent international tribunals, with the Rome Statute of the ICC being the first to 
articulate applicable sources of law.37 As part of the IMT judgment, a partial definition of 
the sources of international criminal law was enumerated. Notably, it was limited to 
defining only one aspect of this emerging tradition's substantive law, namely 
international humanitarian law. The IMT followed the post-WWI American position, 
discussed above, that treaty and custom constitute the substantive law being applied. 
While not adopting principles of humanity (i.e. the Martens Clause) as a source of law, 
the IMT did cautiously recognize the need for progressive development in the law: 
The law of war is to be found not only in treaties, but in the customs and practices of 
states which gradually obtained universal recognition, and from the general princip les of 
justice applied by jurists and practiced by military courts. This law is not static, but by 
continuai adaptation follows the needs of a changing world. Indeed, in many cases 
treaties do no more than express and define for more accurate reference the principles of 
law already existing.38 
Law-Making Authortfy of International j udges: Procedural and Evidentiary Law 
36 John Quigley, "Soviet Influences on International Criminal Law in the Nuremberg Era" (1996) 7 Crim. L. 
F. 447 at 448-450; see also generally, George Ginsburgs, Moscow's Road to Nuremberg: The Soviet 
Background to the Trial (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1996). 
37 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF. 183/9, art. 21 [ICC Statute]. 
38 IMT Judgement, supra note 1 at Judgement: The Law of the Charter [emphasis added]. 
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With respect to rules of international criminal procedure, Article 13 of the Nuremberg 
Charter simply stated: "The Tribunal shaH draw up rules for its procedure. These rules 
shaH not be inconsistent with the provisions of this Charter. ,,39 Such rules were adopted, 
but were quite Spartan by any standard.40 Article 19 of the Nuremberg Charter similarly 
provided with respect to international criminal evidentiary law: "The Tribunal shaH not be 
bound by technical rules of evidence. It shaH adopt and apply to the greatest possible 
extent expeditious and non-technical procedure, and shaH admit any evidence which it 
deems to have probative value.,,41 The Tokyo Charter adopted language identical to this 
provision, but also added: "[ ... ] AH purported admissions or statements of the accused are 
admissible.,,42 In practice, the IMT and IMTFE have been criticized because "the judges 
made the rules of procedure and evidence as they went along", which resulted in 
"inconsistency of judicial rulings". 43 
Based on the vast discretionary authority on admissibility issues, the IMT was criticized 
for admitting hearsay and opinion evidence during its proceedings.44 However, Richard 
39 Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 8 August 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, art. 13 
[Nuremberg Charter]; see also ibid, art. 24; see also Charter of the International Military Tribunalfor the 
Far East, 19 January 1946, amended Apr. 26, 1946, T.LA.S. No. 1589, art. 7, online: Avalon Project 
<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imtfech.htm> [Tokyo Charter]; see also ibid, art. 15; see Rules of 
Procedure of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, 25 April 1946, online: Avalon Project 
<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imtferul.htm>. The IMT's Chief Prosecutors were together 
responsible "to draw up and recommend to the Tribunal for its approval draft mIes of procedure, 
contemplated by Article 13 of this Charter. The Tribunal shaH have the power to accept, with or without 
amendments, or to reject, the mIes so recommended": Nuremberg Charter, ibid, art. 14(e). 
40 International Military Tribunal, Rules of Procedure, 29 October 1945, Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 
1, Rules of Procedure, online: Avalon Project <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imtlproc/imtrules.htm> 
[IMT Rules]. 
41 Nuremberg Charter, supra note 39, art. 19. 
42 Tokyo Charter, supra note 39, art. 13(a). 
43 May & Wierda, 2002, supra note 2 at xiv. 
44 de Than & Shorts, supra note 4 at 276. 
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May and Marieke Wierda have argued in favour of this approach to admissibility at 
Nuremberg based on the mixed nature of the trial, blending aspects of the common law 
and civilian traditions: 
Although the trials were adversarial and the parties alone were responsible for caHing the 
evidence, the judges were sitting without a jury, and the common law rules designed to 
prevent jurors from hearing prejudicial evidence were discarded in favour of a liberal 
approach akin to that of civillaw systems.45 
Another example of the blending of traditions occurred among the Nuremberg 
Prosecutors, hailing from both common and civilian traditions, over the requirements of 
the charging documents.46 
As a result of these provisions, the Nuremberg approach of vesting institutional authority 
in international judges to make procedural and evidentiary law was followed in 
subsequent international tribunals,47 which similarly lacked an external legislative body 
that could enact and amend such roles. The variation being that the modem ad hoc 
tribunals enacted detailed Rules of Procedure and Evidence to apply beforehand, which 
45 May & Wierda, 1999, supra note 18 at 729. 
46 Johnathan A. Bush, "Lex Americana: Constitutional Due Process and the Nuremberg Defendants" (2001) 
45 St. Louis L. J. 515 at 524. 
47 See Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 
1991, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., Annex, V.N. Doc. S/827 (1993), art. 15 [ICTY 
Statute]: "The judges of the International Tribunal shaH adopt rules of procedure and evidence for the 
conduct of the pre-trial phase of the proceedings, trials and appea1s, the admission of evidence, the 
protection of victims and witnesses and other appropriate matters." Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Other Such Violations 
Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States, S.c. Res. 955, V.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453 mtg., 
Annex, V.N. doc S/955 (1994), art. 14 [ICTR Statute]: "The Judges of the International Tribunal for 
Rwanda shan adopt, for the purpose ofproceedings before the International Tribunal for Rwanda, the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence for the conduct of the pre-trial phase of the proceedings, trials and appeals, the 
admission of evidence, the protection of victims and witnesses and other appropriate matters of the 
International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia with such changes as they deem necessary." 
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have been frequently reviewed and amended.48 It has been observed that this approach 
"gave the judges of the[se ... ] tribunals a quasi-Iegislative power, which was, for all 
practical purposes, unmatched in the world's major legal systems where distinctions 
between legislative and judicial powers are carefully observed.,,49 As will be discussed, 
however, judges of the ICC have very limited formaI law-making authority with respect 
to rules of procedure and evidence, with primary legislative authority being vested in the 
Assembly of States Parties. 50 
Answering Unanswered Questions 
A natural consequence of the Nuremberg Charter' s failure to define applicable sources of 
law, the allowance for judge-made procedural and evidentiary law, and the nascent state 
of international criminal law at the time, was that questions would inevitably arise for 
which there were no clear answers. The result was that rules and concepts were borrowed 
and imported from national legal traditions. However, "[ e ]xperiences in national legal 
systems are not easily transferable to international legal institutions. More particularly, 
they cannot easily be merged with other national experiences".51 
It may be for these reasons that the IMT hid the normative basis of sorne of its important 
decisions, such that the independent sources of the international criminal law tradition 
48 See International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Commirted in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, Ru/es of 
Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. IT/32 (1994), as amended [ICTY Rules]; International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, Ru/es of Procedure and Evidence, V.N. Doc. ITR/3/Rev.1 (1995), as amended [ICTR 
Ru1es]. 
49 May & Wierda, 2002, supra note 2 at xiv [emphasis added]. 
50 Ibid. at 20. 
Sl Ibid. at xv. 
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were concealed. This may be se en in a pre-trial decision on trials in absentia of mentally 
incapacitated accused, and in the IMT' s final judgment regarding the definition of 
conspiracy. 
Defence Counsel for the Defendant Krupp von Bohlen argued before the IMT that the 
accused, who was suffering from serious mental illness, should not be tried in absentia.52 
Defence Counsel relied on the civilian legal tradition in support of this argument: 
[ ... ] the procedure in absentia against Krupp, would be contrary to justice, not only 
according to the provisions of the Charter but also according to the generally recognized 
princip les of the law of procedure of civilized states. 
So far as 1 am informed, no law of procedure of a continental state permits a court 
procedure against somebody who is absent, mentally deranged, and completely incapable 
of arguing his case. According to the German Law of Procedure, the trial must be 
postponed in such a case (Paragraph 205 of the German Code of Criminal Law). If 
prohibiting the trial of a defendant, who is incapable of being trie d, is a generally 
recognized princip le of procedure (principe général de droit reconnu par des nations 
civilisées) in the sense ofParagraph 38 (c) of the Statute of the International Court in The 
Hague, then a tribunal upon which the attention of the whole world is, and the attention of 
future generations will be directed, cannot ignore this prohibition. 53 
In response, Mf. Justice Robert Jackson, Chief of Counsel for the United States conceded 
that "a man in the physical and mental condition of Krupp could not be tried" under 
American law or under the law of "most of the jurisdictions".54 Sir Hartley Shawcross, 
Chief Prosecutor of the United Kingdom, also admitted that under English criminal law, 
such a trial could not take place.55 Nevertheless, Justice Jackson argued that the IMT 
should try the accused and ignore common criminallaws of the world: 
52 United States of America et al. v. Hermann Wilhelm Goring et al., Trials of the Major War Criminals 
Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 2, Preliminary Hearing, 14 
November 1945 at 1, online: Avalon Project <http://www.mazal.orgiarchive/imtl02/lmt02-TOOl.htm> 
[IMT Preliminary Hearing). 
53 Ibid. at 3 [emphasis added). 
54 Ibid. at 9. 
55 Ibid. at 12. 
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Of course, trial in absentia has great disadvantages. It would not comply with the 
constitution al standard for citizens of the United States in prosecutions conducted in our 
country. It presents grave difficulties to counsel under the circumstances of this case. Yet, 
in framing the Charter, we had to take into account that all manner of avoidances of trial 
would be in the interests of the defendants, and therefore, the Charter authorized trial in 
absentia when in the interests of justice, leaving this broad generality as the only guide to 
the Court's discretion.56 
Without explicitly stating the basis for its decision, the IMT decided in a brief one-page 
order to grant the postponement of the proceedings against the Defendant Krupp -
effectively refusing to try him.57 Given the confidential nature of the IMT' s judicial 
deliberations, it is equally possible that the trial of this accused was prevented on account 
of the IMT' s independent assessment of the 'interests of justice', or its decision to follow 
the approach directed by common criminal laws of the world. The fact that it is 
impossible to know the basis of the decision, or how it was made, prevented it from 
transmitting information about the inner workings of the international criminal law 
tradition. 
Similarly, in considering the elements of conspiracy, which was not defined in the 
Nuremberg Charter, the IMT judgment outlined a definition ofthis mode ofresponsibility 
without invoking any authorities whatsoever: 
Conspiracy is not defined in the Charter. But in the opinion of the Tribunal the conspiracy 
must be clearly outlined in its criminal purpose. It must not be too far removed from the 
time of decision and of action. The planning, to be criminal, must not rest merely on the 
declarations of a party programme, such as are found in the twenty five points of the Nazi 
Party, announced in 1920, or the political affIrmations expressed in 'Mein Kampf in later 
years. The Tribunal must examine whether a con crete plan to wage war existed, and 
56 Ibid at 5 [emphasis added]. 
57 United States of America et al. v. Gustav Krupp von Bah/en et al., Order of the Tribunal Granting 
Postponement of Proceedings Against Gustav Krupp von Bohlen, 15 November 1945, online: Avalon 
Project <http://www.mazal.org/archive/imt/01lIMT01-T143.htm> [IMT, Krupp Decision]. It should be 
noted that another accused, Martin Bormann, Head of the Nazi Party Chancellery was tried in absentia and 
sentenced to death: Kittichaisaree, supra note Il at 18. 
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determine the participants in that concrete plan. It is not necessary to decide whether a 
single master conspiracy between the defendants has been established by the evidence.58 
Again, these opaque reasons have hampered the development of international criminal 
law because they offer no guidance or methodology as to how an international tribunal 
may go about identifying norms and elaborating rules which are not already explicitly set 
out in formaI sources oflaw. 
Affects on other Traditions 
The birth of international criminal law at Nuremberg also had external effects in, and 
across, other legal traditions. In particular, the substantive and pro ce duraI innovations of 
the Nuremberg process spurred developments in national human rights law,59 and 
contributed to the advent of regional human rights law and bodies such as the European 
Court of Human Rights.60 At the same time, there was a flurry of activity in international 
humanitarian law, leading to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Nuremberg promised to give 
this previously meager body of law sorne real teeth, and this was recognized by the 
inclusion of the 'grave breaches' provisions in international humanitarian law treaties, 
which have been interpreted to codify individual criminal responsibility.61 
58 IMT Judgement, supra note 1 at Judgement: The Law as to the Common Plan or Conspiracy. 
59 Ellen Ash Peters, "Symposium: Law, War and Human Rights: International Courts and the Legacy of 
Nuremberg: The Capacity of Judicial Institutions to Play an Affirmative Role in the International Protection 
of Human Rights: Implications for and from Domestic Law" (1997) 12 Conn. J. Int'l L. 219 at 222-3. 
60 Mark W. Janis, "Symposium: Law, War and Human Rights: International Courts and the Legacy of 
Nuremberg - The Utility ofInternational Criminal Courts" (1997) 12 Conn. J. Int'l L. 161 at 168. 
61 See Convention (1) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the 
Field, Geneva, 12 August 1949, art. 50 [GC 1]; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Geneva, 12 August 1949, art. 51 [GC 
II]; Convention (III) relative to the Treatment ofPrisoners ofWar, Geneva, 12 August 1949, art. 130 [GC 
III]; Convention (IV) relative to the Protection ofCivilian Persons in Time ofWar, Geneva, 12 August 
1949, art. 147 [GC IV], aIl online: ICRC <http://www.icrc.org>. 
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Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: Control Council Law No. 10 
The possibility of an international criminal law tradition emerging from the post-WWII 
era would have been substantially diminished were it not for the creation of military 
tribunals under Control Council Law No. la which tried lesser Nazi war criminals on the 
basis of the precedent of the IMT judgment, giving it immediate relevance and 
refinement. Confusion is apparent in the case law of these military tribunals as to 
whether they were international tribunals applying internationallaw or not. In one case, a 
Control Council Law No. la tribunal explicitly identified itself as an international 
tribunal which administered internationallaw - a position confirmed by the D.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia which held that the tribunal' s "powers and 
jurisdiction arose out of the joint sovereignty of the Four victorious powers".62 However, 
in another case, a Control Council Law No. 10 tribunal took the view that "this is an 
American court of Justice, applying the ancient and fundamental concepts of Anglo-
Saxon jurisprudence".63 For its part, Control Council Law No. la explicitly sought to 
establish a degree of uniformity in the norms applied in prosecuting war criminals in 
Germany after WWII, suggesting that these tribunals were not to simply apply the 
respective nationallaws of the victorious powers in their zones of occupation: 
In order to give effect to the terms of the Moscow Declaration of30 October 1943 and the 
London Agreement of 8 August 1945, and the Charter issued pursuant thereto and in 
order to establish a uniform legal basis in Germany for the prosecution ofwar criminals 
62 Flick v. Johnson, 174 F.2d. 983, 984-986; cert. den. 338 U.S. 879 (1949) and Trial of Frederick Flick and 
Five Others ('Flick' case), Trials ofWar Criminals, vol. VI, p. 1188 cited in Erdemovié, Judges McDonald 
and Vohrah, supra note 35, para. 53. 
63 Trial of Erhard Milch ('Milch' case), Trials ofWar Criminals, vol. II, p. 778 cited in Erdemovié, Judges 
McDonald and Vohrah, supra note 35, para. 53. 
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and other similar ofJenders, other than those dealt with by the International Military 
Tribunal, the Control Council enacts as follows: [ ... t 4 
However, the degree to which uniformity of the legal basis for prosecutions under Control 
Council Law No. 10 took place in practice in the Allied Zones varied widely. The best 
examples of "systematic and mutually harmonious" implementation of the law reportedly 
took place in the V.S. and French zones, while the British zone relied on a Royal 
Warrant65 for their trials, and the Soviets failed to conduct trials pursuant to the Control 
Council Law No. 10 at aIl. 66 
Past International Criminal Law Decisions as Precedent 
The common law concept of precedent was quickly adopted by the Control Council Law 
No. 10 military tribunals as they frequently relied on the IMT judgment. For example, 
the Military Tribunal in Farben, acting under Control Council Law No. 10, held that the 
IMT judgment was "basic and persuasive precedent".67 This carefully chosen language 
of 'persuasive precedent' is significant in that these tribunals did not consider themselves 
to be strictly bound through stare decisis to the IMT judgment. 
&lationship with other Legal Traditions in Words and Action 
64 Law No. 10 of the Control Councilfor Germany, Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany, 
preamble, online: Avalon Project <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avaloniimt/imtlO.htm> [Control Council 
Law No. 10; emphasis added]. 
65 Royal Warrant- Regulationfor the Trial ofWar Criminals (U.K.), 0160/2498, A.O. 81/1945, 18 June 
1945,online: Avalon Project <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalonlimt/imtroyal.htm>. 
66 Daryl A. Mundis, "Completing the Mandates of the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals: Lessons 
from the Nuremberg Process" (2005) 28 Fordham Int'l L. J. 591 at 599-560. 
67 United States of America v. Carl Krauch et al. (Farben Case), Case No. 6, Military Tribunal VI in Trials 
ofWar Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, Vol. VIII 
(United States: Government Printing Office, 1953) at 1098, online: Avalon Project 
<http://www.mazal.orglarchive/nmt/04/NMT04-TOOO 1.htrn> [F arben]. 
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A critical reading of the Control Council Law No. 10 proceedings reveals a more 
transparent approach than the IMT decisions on so-called unanswered questions. These 
subsequent military tribunals also articulated a more coherent relationship between 
existing legal traditions (principally the common law / Anglo-American, and civilian / 
Continental systems) and the emerging international criminallaw tradition. 
A significant holding in the Hostages Case provided that "if a principle is found to have 
been accepted generally as a fundamental rule of justice by most nations in their 
municipal law, its declaration as a rule of international law would seem to be fully 
justified.,,68 National rules of criminallaw become applicable at the internationallevel on 
this view only when there is sufficient accord among them. As discussed later, once 
transposed, these rules may take on an independent existence at the international level. 
Subsequently, they may flow back into nationallegal traditions and influence them, with 
the cycle repeating itself over time. In Chapter 3, the ICC's complementarity regime will 
be considered in light of this observation. 
However, despite this theoretical approach as described in the Hostages Case, an analysis 
of the Control Council Law No. 10 proceedings demonstrates that these judges only 
narrowly considered national laws, or simply applied their own national laws.69 In 
Farben, American criminal law was heavily relied upon by the Military Tribunal lU 
resolving issues unaddressed by its formallaw, despite Defence Counsel's "controversy 
68 As interpreted by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovié, Case No. IT-96-22, 
Appeals Chamber, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Stephen, 7 October 1997, para. 25 
[Erdemovié, Judge Stephen; emphasis added]. 
69 Kirtichaisaree, supra note Il at 44. 
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whether the rules governing this case should be derived from the German penal law or 
from a judicial system based either on the continental law of Europe or on the all 
embracing internationallaw". 70 The Military Tribunal cited the IMT judgment on the law 
regarding conspiracy, and developed it further by invoking case law of the United States 
Supreme Court.7l It also expressly invoked fundamental principles of 'Anglo-American 
criminallaw' regarding the rights of the accused: 
In weighing the evidence and in determining the ultimate facts of guilt or innocence with 
respect to each defendant, we have sought to apply these fundamental principles of Anglo-
American criminallaw: 
1. There can be no conviction without proof of personal guilt. 
2. Guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
3. Each defendant is presumed to be innocent, and that presumption abides with him 
throughout the trial. 
4. The burden ofproofis, at aIl times, upon the prosecution. 
5. Iffrom credible evidence two reasonable inferences may be drawn, one of guilt and the 
other of innocence, the latter must prevail. 72 
Whether these principles were in fact part of a broader transnational common criminal 
law was not considered by the Military Tribunal - they were only grounded in the 
common law tradition. 
However, in the Einsatzgruppen Case, in confirming that individuals may be responsible 
for certain violations of international law, the Military Tribunal cited the Hague and 
Geneva Conventions, as well as the Recht der Landkriegsfuehrung (German Military 
70 Farben, supra note 67 at 954. 
71 See ibid at 1127. 
72 Ibid at 1108. 
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Manual) and a collection on German Military Law.73 This willingness to incorporate 
nationallegal traditions did not extend to the communist legal order in this case. Defence 
Counsel had argued that Soviet criminallaw afforded a defence of 'self-defence on behalf 
of a third party', and sought to invoke the doctrine. The Military Tribunal responded in a 
cynical and revealing passage of its decision, rejecting the possibility: 
In developing this theme of defense for Germany, Dr. Aschenauer insisted that this 
Tribunal apply his interpretation of Soviet law. One cannot avoid noting the paradox of 
the defendant's invoking the law of a country whose jurisprudence, ideologies, 
government and social system were aU declared antagonistic to Germany, and which very 
laws, ideologies, govemment, and social system the defendants, with the rest of the 
German Armed Forces, had set out to destroy. However, it is the prerogative of defense 
counsel to advance any argument which he deems appropriate in behalf of his client and 
the fact that Dr. Aschenauer considers Soviet law more modem than German law cannot 
fail to be interesting.74 
The Military Tribunal ultimately rejected this Soviet criminallaw defence, indicating that 
it did not correspond "with any acceptable tenets of internationallaw". 75 The generalized 
nature of the rejection seems suspect, given that other Military Tribunals had no difficulty 
applying or questioning nationallaw from a single jurisdiction, principally the U.S., with 
which they were more familiar and from which they hailed. 
From these cases, it appears that theoretical insistence on deriving general principles of 
law from national legal systems was not followed up in practice with any real 
comparative analysis by the post-WWII tribunals. This internaI contradiction in the early 
practice of the international criminal law has persisted, albeit to a lesser extent, at the 
modem ad hoc tribunals, as discussed in the next chapter. 
73 United States of America v. Otto Ohlendorf et al. (Einsatzgruppen Case), Case No. 9, Military Tribunal 
II-A in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 
10, Vol. IV at 460-1, online: Avalon Project <http://www.mazal.org/archive/nmt/04/NMT04-T0460.htm> 
[Einsatzgruppen] . 
74 Ibid. at 462-3. 
75 Ibid. at 464. 
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Implications of BarlY Institutions of International Criminal Law 
International criminal law emerged in an institutional 'vacuum' .76 While a Permanent 
International Court of Justice had been in existence for over two decades under the 
auspices of the League of Nations, it was limited to disputes between States and 
concerned itself with questions of public internationallaw. Entirely new institutions had 
to be created to try individuals for international crimes before international judges. 
These early institutions of international criminal law came into existence alongside the 
prosecution of war criminals before national courts after WWII. 77 A defining feature of 
the international criminallaw tradition is, therefore, its competitive (or 'complementary') 
relationship with national jurisdictions and their distinct legal systems. Without a space 
in which to develop and proliferate after WWII until the end of the Cold War, an 
international criminallaw tradition could not truly emerge. Like any tradition, it required 
room in which to develop and grow. The modem ad hoc tribunals, discussed in Chapter 
2, were able to make so much headway in developing the tradition largely owing to their 
powerful jurisdictional primacy and comparatively vast infrastructure. 78 
76 May & Wierda, 2002, supra note 2 at xiv. 
77 See London Agreement of August 8th 1945, Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 1, arts. 4, 6, online: 
Avalon Project <http://www.yale.edullawweb/avalonlimtlproc/imtchart.htm> [emphasis added]. 
78 See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadié, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Appeals Chamber, Decision on the Defence 
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995 at paras. 56, 58 (requesting Germany defer 
to the ICTY) [Tadié, Appeals Decision on Jurisdiction]; ln the Matter of a Proposai for a Formai Request 
for DeferraI ta the Competence of the Tribunal Addressed ta the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
Respect of Radovan Karadiié, Ratko Mladié and Miéo Stanisié, Case No. IT -95-5-D, Trial Chamber, 
Decision on the Bosnian Serb Leadership DeferraI ProposaI, 16 May 1995 at paras. 2, 5, 26 (requesting 
Bosnia and Herzegovina defer to the ICTY); see also Madeline Harris, "The Trials of Concurrent 
Jurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda" in M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed., International Criminal Law, Vol. III, 2nd 
ed. (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 1999) at 576-7 (requesting Rwanda and Belgium defer to the 
ICTR) [Bassiouni, 1999]. 
29 
/"- .. 
Origins of the International Cri minai Law Tradition 
Another defining institutional aspect ofthe early institutions of international criminallaw, 
as weU as the modem ad hoc tribunals, is their symbiotic relationship with political 
considerations. These institutions, much like their successors, were created in response to 
atrocious events in war, such that "these institutions have been shaped by politicalleaders 
and diplomats rather than by jurists with experience in international and comparative 
criminal law and procedure.'.79 Antonio Cassese has acknowledged that international 
criminallaw and international politics "are forever intertwined [ ... ] We are aware that so 
long as international political demands are at odds with interests of justice, justice might 
have to capitulate. But we are making huge effort to avoid such a capitulation."so While 
the ICC as a permanent institution is relatively more insulated from specific political 
motivations, the process of drafting the Rome Statute was a mixed exercise of diplomats 
with comparative and international lawyers, and representatives of civil society (i.e. non-
State actors). 
Loosely interlocking institutions was another important early feature of international 
criminal law institutions. The IMT judgment and infrastructure was largely made 
available for the subsequent Control Council Law No. 10 cases, significantly facilitating 
their achievements. S1 As discussed, Control Council Law No. 10's caU for uniform 
application of law meant that at least sorne degree of consistency resulted. However, 
79 May & Wierda, 2002, supra note 2 at xiii. 
80 Antonio Cassese, "Symposium: Law, War and Human Rights: International Courts and the Legacy of 
Nuremberg: Remarks Given at the Old State House" (1997) 12 Conn. J. Int'l L. 201 at 207-8. 
81 Mundis, supra note 66 at 613. The IMT judgement was also a very important precedent for the IMTFE: 
Kittichaisaree, supra note Il at 19. 
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since there was no appellate procedure, it was not entirely possible to ensure coherent 
application of law across the various Military Tribunals deciding cases under the 
authority of Control Council Law No. 10, despite aspirations to do so. The lifespan of 
these post-WWII tribunals was also quite limited, such that aIl trials were complete within 
several years, and decision-makers were restricted to the nationalities of the Allied 
judges. These institutional realities combined with the virtual absence of war crimes 
prosecutions until the creation of the ICTY after the end of the Cold War82 meant that 
international criminallaw was a relatively primitive and impoverished body of law at this 
stage. 
Conclusion 
Without the advent of the modern ad hoc tribunals, it would have been impossible to calI 
the post-WWII tribunals the birthplace of an international criminal law tradition - they 
would have simply been a historical moment, and nothing more. Continuity was only 
achieved as the modern ad hoc tribunals looked back and drew, sometimes heavily, upon 
the post-WWII tribunals to claim their legitimacy, gained over time, and in so doing also 
inherited many of the same underlying assumptions, challenges and controversies of these 
legacy tribunals. 
A critical analysis of the origins of the emerging international criminal law tradition has 
provided important insights into its fundamental core. First and foremost, it is a hybrid 
tradition which seeks legitimacy and answers to difficult questions by drawing on other 
82 RoelofHavemanet al., eds., Supranational Criminal Law: A System Sui Generis (Antwerp: Intersentia, 
2003) at 1. 
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established legal traditions. In practice, it has struggled to do so effectively for 
institutional reasons as weIl as obvious difficulties in attempting to reconcile vastly 
different national legal systems. Secondly, its aims appear to be frequently at odds: 
enhancing humanitarian protection, on one hand, and protecting the rights of the accused 
on the other. Third, its institutional structure has traditionally vested significant law-
making power in the hands of international judges. The nagging question as to whether 
the unresolved tensions in the international criminal law tradition are systematic and 
intrinsic only grows as the experience of the modem ad hoc tribunals is critically 
evaluated. 
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Development of the International Criminal Law Tradition: ICTY IR 
The development of international criminallaw through over a decade of jurisprudence at 
the ICTY and ICTR has confirmed many of the features of this emergent tradition as 
discussed in Chapter 1, and made it possible to focus sharply on fundamental questions 
about its sources and institutions. The hybrid nature of international criminal law makes 
it impossible to confine its sources to simple reiterations of the sources of public 
international law, despite repeated attempts to do so. The intractable tensions already 
identified in the origins of this tradition, between extending humanitarian protection and 
ensuring fairness to the accused, have only intensified and continue to be at the crux of 
hard cases which have come before the modem ad hoc tribunals. Renewed interest in the 
Martens Clause, discussed in Chapter 1, and a proliferation in codification of international 
humanitarian law in 1949 and 1977 has added new normative force to extending 
humanitarian protection. On the other hand, international human rights law has similarly 
experienced massive growth and codification since the post-WWII tribunals, meaning 
that an accused in any criminal proceeding is entitled to a broader range of specifie rights, 
and more generally, to guarantees of a fair trial. 
In several noteworthy instances, the modem ad hoc tribunals have explicitly resolved 
lacunae in international criminal law based on favouring extending humanitarian 
protection over ensuring fairness to the accused, and vice versa. In other cases, national 
laws, as part of grander common law and civilian legal traditions, have served a 'gap 
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filling' function. It is argued that these transnational common laws have not simply been 
aggregated to establish rules of customary international law or general principles of law, 
but have been drawn upon at the discretion of these international judges as persuasive, 
non-binding authority. This controversial view is particularly significant given that 
Article 21 of the Rome Statute explicitly contemplates that "national laws will provide a 
'fall-back' resource similar to that in the current [ad hoc] tribunals".83 
Struggling to Refine Sources of Law and Interpretive Doctrines 
The Statutes of the modern ad hoc tribunals were handed down by the D.N. Security 
Council, offering a definitive constitutional document to be applied, serving the same 
function as the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters. Similar to the post-WWII tribunals, 
these modern judges were empowered to enact Rules of Procedure and Evidence, but this 
time amended them substantially over time based on experience gained during successive 
proceedings, and based on "general principles underlying the major legal systems of the 
world".84 
While the Statutes of the modern ad hoc tribunals are more detailed than the Nuremberg 
and Tokyo Charters, they similarly do not include an explicit definition of applicable 
law.85 Sorne observers consider that this has been the practice owing to 'political 
considerations', namely that it would be difficult to obtain prompt agreement among 
83 May & Wierda, 2002, supra note 2 at 102. 
84 May & Wierda, 1999, supra note 18 at 735. 
85 They did, however, authorize the application of various international treaties, including grave breaches of 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and, additionally in the case of the ICTR, serious violations of Additional 
Protocol II of 1977: see ICTY Statute, supra note 47, art. 2; ICTR Statute, supra note 47, art. 4. 
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States on what law(s) should be applicable. 86 Cherif Bassiouni has charged that matters 
that were unaddressed in the legacy and modem ad hoc tribunal statutes "have been dealt 
with on an ad hoc and sometimes an improvised manner".87 Unlike the IMT and IMTFE 
which only consisted of one mega-trial each, however, the modem ad hoc tribunals were 
created to prosecute dozens of separate cases. When faced with questions which were not 
resolved in their Statutes or Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the judges of these modem 
ad hoc tribunals felt it necessary to articulate a de facto definition of applicable law to 
lend legitimacy to their adjudication and provide a degree of theoretical coherence to the 
emerging international criminal law tradition. In so doing, these judges went beyond the 
rudimentary judicial definition of applicable law offered in the IMT judgment, discussed 
in Chapter 1, which referred only to sources of international humanitarian law - one part 
of the substantive law of international criminallaw. 
Public internationallaw, international humanitarian law, international human rights law, 
and national criminal laws are streams which feed international criminallaw. Given that 
there was no international criminal code in the mid-1990s when the ad hoc tribunals were 
created, nationallegal traditions varied in their identification of sources of criminallaws, 
and international humanitarian law offered no guidance on how to conduct a criminal 
trial, resort to general public international law was thought to be a logical place to find 
broadly defined sources of international criminallaw. Specifically, judges of the modem 
ad hoc tribunals adopted Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
86 Bassiouni, 2003, supra note 34 at 267. 
87 Ibid., at 263. 
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(lCl Statute )88 as their own to provide a normative super-structure to define applicable 
sources of international criminallaw. 89 Commentators have explicitly indicated the need, 
however, for these sources of law to be "subject to the principles of legality which derive 
from general principles of law".9o Likewise, in interpreting their Statutes, the modern ad 
hoc tribunals have imported Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties91 to define the interpretive canons of international criminallaw,92 despite the fact 
that the Statutes of these tribunals were created under V.N. Security Council resolutions 
and are not, strictly speaking, international treaties. 
88 Reproduced in Appendix: ICJ Statute, supra note 31, art. 38(1). 
89 See, e.g., for ICTY: Prosecutor v. Anto Furundiija, Case No. IT-95-1711-A, Appeals Chamber, 
Declaration of Judge Patrick Robinson, 21 July 2000, p. 94 at n. 10 [Furundiija, Judge Robinson]; 
Erdemovié, Judges McDonald and Vohrah, supra note 35, para. 40; Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Case 
No. IT-95-1411-A, Appeals Chamber, Declaration of Judge David Hunt, 24 March 2000, n. 1 [Aleksovski, 
Judge Hunt]; see also, e.g., for ICTR: Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, Appeals 
Chamber, Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, 31 May 2000, n. 20; Prosecutor v. Jean Bosco 
Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Appeals Chamber, Decision (Prosecutor's Request for Review 
ofReconsideration), 31 March 2000, para. 20. 
90 Bassiouni, 2003, supra note 34 at 4. 
91 Reproduced in Appendix: Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 V.N.T.S. 331, 
arts. 31-32. 
92 See, e.g., for ICTY: Prosecutor v. Enver Hadtïhasanovié et al., Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Trial Chamber, 
Decision on Joint Challenge to Jurisdiction, 12 November 2002, para. 63 ("the Trial Chamber is bound to 
interpret the Statute in accordance with Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties"); 
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadié et al., Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgement, 15 July 1999, para. 
300 [Tadié, Appeals Judgement]; Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simié et al., Case No. IT-95-9, Trial Chamber, 
Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance to be Provided by SFOR and Others, 18 October 2000, para. 47; 
Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevié, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Trial Chamber, Reasons for Decision on 
Assignment of Defence Counsel, 22 September 2004, para. 31 ("From the earliest days of the work of the 
International Tribunal, it was decided that the Statute is to be interpreted as a treaty."); see also, e.g., for 
ICTR: Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora and 28 Others, Case No. ICTR-98-37-A, Appeals Chamber, 
Decision on the Admissibility of the Prosecutor's Appeal From the Decision of a Confirming Judge 
Dismissing an Indictment Against Théoneste Bagosora and 28 Others, 8 June 1998, para. 28 ("The Appeals 
Chamber agrees with the Prosecutor on the applicability, mutatis mutandis, of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties to the Statute.") [Bagosora, Appeals Decision]; Prosecutor v. Joseph Kanyabashi, Case 
No. ICTR-96-15-A, Joint Separate and Concurring Opinion of Judge Wang Tieya and Judge Rafael Nieto-
Navia,3 June 1999, para. Il ("[ ... ] the rules of the Vienna Convention, and Article 31 in particular, reflect 
customary rules of interpretation which originate from principles found in systems of municipallaw [ ... ]"). 
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The implications of the modem ad hoc tribunals incorporating these public international 
law concepts into international criminal law have been largely ignored. Without a doubt, 
however, the case law of these tribunals demonstrates difficulties in importing these 
general public international law doctrines, designed to deal with legal disputes between 
States "based on a consensual relationship between co-equal sovereigns",93 into 
international criminallaw, which is designed to prosecute individuals. It also presents, in 
concrete terms, analogous problems to those which will realistically arise under Article 
21 of the Rome Statute. Even where sources of law are provided for, there will be 
lacunae which must be identified and understood, preferably before they appear in 
practice. 
Sources of Law 
With respect to sources of law, most of the difficulties anse with respect to Article 
38(l)(c) of the ICJ Statute which refers to "general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations".94 In their Joint and Separate Opinion in Erdemovié, Judge McDonald 
and Judge Vohrah of the ICTY Appeals Chamber stated that "one purpose of this article 
is to avoid a situation of non-liquet, that is, where an international tribunal is stranded by 
an absence of applicable legal rules".95 In actually deriving these general principles, the 
approach adopted by these judges was described by them as follows: 
it is generally accepted that the distillation of a 'general principle of law recognised by 
civilised nations' does not require the comprehensive survey of all legal systems of the 
world as this would involve a practical impossibility and has never been the practice of 
the International Court of Justice or other international tribunals which have had recourse 
to Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute [ ... ] In light ofthese considerations, our approach 
93 Bassiouni, 2003, supra note 34 at II. 
94 ICJ Statute, supra note 31, art. 38(l)(c). 
95 Erdemovié, Judges McDonald and Vohrah, supra note 35, para. 57. 
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will necessarily not involve a direct comparison of the specifie rules of each of the 
world's le gal systems, but will instead involve a survey of those jurisdictions whose 
jurisprudence is, as a practical matter, accessible to us in an effort to discem a general 
trend, policy or princip le underlying the concrete rules of thatjurisdiction which comports 
with the object and purpose of the establishment of the International Tribunal.96 
There are, however, several problems with the approach described by Judge McDonald 
and Judge Vohrah, despite its obvious pragmatic justification. First, there is no answer 
provided for how extensive a survey of national legal systems is required. In the sarne 
case, Judge Stephen held that "no universal acceptance of a particular principle by every 
nation within the main systems of law is necessary before lacunae can be filled; it is 
enough that the prevailing number of nations within each of the main Jamilies of laws 
recognize such a principle.,,97 By 'farnilies of laws', it is highly probable that Judge 
Stephen is referring to legal traditions. The legal traditions that the modem ad hoc 
tribunals have drawn upon and validated in practice are considered later in this Chapter, 
but it may be noted here that they are limited to Western legal traditions (i.e. common and 
civillaw) in all but the rare st cases. 
Secondly, jurisdictions which are accessible 'as a practical matter' clearly imports 
institutional considerations into the equation which have undoubtedly affected the 
development of international criminal law. This tradition is not alone in this 
phenomenon, however. Historically, law travels only where it is known and in a 
language that is understood by its adherents.98 Recalling the earlier discussion of the 
relationship between the staffing of the IMT on the national laws that it considered from 
96 Ibid., para. 57. 
97 Erdemovié, Judge Stephen, supra note 68, para. 25 [emphasis added]. 
98 H. Patrick Glenn, On Common Laws (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) at 62 [Glenn, On Common 
Laws]. 
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Chapter 1, it appears that Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah have accepted this practice 
as legitimate at the modem ad hoc tribunal s, which are required to staff their positions 
based on more diverse geographic representation. 
Third, there may be a degree of incommensurability between the legal families or 
traditions that the modem ad hoc tribunals have turned their mind towards. There are 
significant theoretical and practical limitations in resorting to national laws, which are 
situated in vastly different legal systems, to resolve isolated and narrow questions for 
international criminallaw. In Simié, Judge Hunt recognized this problem in the context 
of international rules of evidence: 
It is not easy to disco ver general principles of law in relation to this issue which are 
recognised by the domestic laws of (aIl) civilised nations. This is because most civillaw 
systems have detailed statutory provisions in relation to evidence which is the subject of 
daims of confidentiality, whereas most common law systems leave it to the courts to 
determine where the balance lies between competing public interests. It is therefore 
necessary, in my view, to commence from first principles. 99 
However, in Delalié, the ICTY Trial Chamber took a different approach, approving of a 
highly discretionary power of the judges to fill gaps in the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence by making ec1ectic use ofnationallaws oftheir choice: 
Whilst not being bound by national mIes of evidence, it seems to the Trial Chamber that 
the Chambers can, where appropriate, be guided by such national mIes. Hence, the 
Chambers may in their discretion apply rules of evidence which will best favour the 
determination of the matter before them. In any case, such laws must be consistent with 
the spirit of the Statute and general princip les of law. 100 
This approach is more generally codified in Rule 89(B) of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence ofboth of the modem ad hoc tribunals, enacted by the judges of the se tribunals: 
99 Prosecutor v. Bladoje Simié et al., Ex Parte and Confidential Opinion of Judge David Hunt on 
Prosecutor's Motion for a Ruling Concerning the Testimony ofa Witness, 27 July 1999, para. 24 (WL). 
100 Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalié et al., Case No. IT-96-21, Trial Chamber, Decision on the Motion to Allow 
Witness K, L, and M to Give Their Testimony by Means ofVideo-Link Conference, 28 May 1997, para. 7. 
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In cases not otherwise provided for in this Section, a Charnber shaH apply rules of 
evidence which will best favour a fair determination of the matter be[ore it and are 
consonant with the spirit of the Statute and the general principles of law. 1 1 
These statements differ sharply from a faithful application of Article 38(1) of the ICJ 
Statute, thus reinforcing the origins of international criminallaw being driven by judicial 
discretion, given its long-standing absence of an external institutional framework to enact, 
amend and repeal the law that is applied. 102 To develop this point further, it is helpful to 
introduce a legal theory which offers an alternative explanatory perspective on how law is 
being selected and applied by the modem ad hoc tribunals in difficult cases where there 
are lacunae in formaI sources. 
Patrick Glenn's theory of transnational common laws offers sorne promising insights 
when applied to the international criminal law tradition. Transnational common laws 
have "no obligatory or mandatory content", yield to particular laws (meaning that they 
largely fulfill a 'gap filling' function), and depend on "persuasion and collaboration, 
amongst jurists, amongst judges.,,103 While Glenn's the ory has been "hampered by the 
idea that the source of an law is the nation-state",104 it has the potential for greater 
purchase in this emergent international tradition, which is not restrained by the 
exclusivity of the domestic law of any given State. The above statements interpreting the 
applicable law at the modem ad hoc tribunals cornes very close to applying these 
lOI ICTY Rules, supra note 48, r. 89(B); ICTR Rules, supra note 48, r. 89(B). 
102 In this regard, the creation of the Assernbly of States Parties for the ICC is a major institutional 
developrnent which will be considered in detail in Chapter 3. 
103 Glenn, On Common Laws, supra note 98 at 62,45. 
104 H. Patrick Glenn, "Transnational Cornrnon Laws" at 1 (undated) [Glenn; "Transnational Cornrnon 
Laws"; on file with author]. 
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transnational common laws, which operate in the background and appear when hard cases 
present themselves. 105 Further evidence of this having taken place in practice is 
considered later in this Chapter - also demonstrating that 'transnational judicial 
dialogue,106 is part of the international criminal law tradition in order to transmit 
information. lndeed, the concept of 'general principles of law' has been seen in other 
contexts to provide a 'liaison' between nationallaws. 107 Similarly, Michèle Buteau and 
Gabriël Oosthuizen have sought to demonstrate that substantive and procedurallacunae in 
the Statutes of the modem ad hoc tribunals are filled by resorting to the inherent, implied, 
or incidental powers of the judges to resolve such matters. 108 At this stage of 
development of the international criminallaw tradition, the final component of Glenn's 
transnational common laws theory - "the recognition of different groups of people to 
whom different laws could be applied,,109 - has yet to fully materialize, but has the 
potential to do so at the ICC based on Article 21(1)(c) of the Rome Statute, discussed 
further in Chapter 3. 110 
This hypothesis that judges at the modem ad hoc tribunals fill lacunae in international 
criminal law in a manner consistent Glenn's transnational common laws theory, as 
105 Glenn, On Common Laws, supra note 98 at 20. 
106 Glenn, "Transnational Cornrnon Laws", supra note 104 at 12, 17. 
107 Glenn, On Common Laws, supra note 98 at 49, n. 19. 
108 Michèle Buteau & Gabriël Oosthuizen, "When the Statute and the Rules are Silent: The Inherent Powers 
of the Tribunal" in Richard Mayet al., eds., Essays on ICTY Procedure and Evidence (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 2001) 65 at 80 
109 Glenn, On Common Laws, supra note 98 at 63. Glenn refers to the theory as relational cornrnon laws as 
weIl. 
110 As will be discussed in Chapter 3, this elernent has been brought in through the operation of Article 
21(1)(c) of the Rome Statute which directs the ICC to apply, "[ ... ] as appropriate, the national laws of 
States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime [ ... ]": ICC Statute, supra note 37, art. 
21(1)(c). 
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opposed to adherence to Article 38(1) of the lCJ Statute, is likely to be controversial. lll 
The aim at this stage, however, is not to provide a normative theory but a descriptive one. 
Glenn's theory is very different from engaging in a detailed comparative analysis of state 
practice and evidence of opinio juris for the purpose of declaring a rule of customary 
international law or finding a general principle of law, within the meaning of Article 
38(1 )(b ),( c) of the lCJ Statute. This distinction was implicitly recognized in Furundiija 
by Judge Robinson who began by noting that "[i]t is perfectly proper, therefore, to 
examine national decisions on a particular question in order to ascertain the existence of 
international custom", 112 but then back -tracked to deny that any such use of nationallaws 
was being made in the judgment: 
Although the Judgement examines provisions in the European Convention on Human 
Rights, decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, decisions from sorne common 
law countries - the United Kingdom, Australia, South Africa and the United States - and 
observes the 'trend in civil law jurisdictions', it does not do so for the pur pose of 
ascertaining whether there is any relevant rule of customary internationallaw. 
The finding which the Chamber makes based upon this examination, is that 'there is a 
general rule that a Judge should not only be subjectively free from bias, but also that 
there should be nothing in the surrounding circumstances which objectively gives rise to 
an appearance of bias.' 113 
Interpretive Doctrines 
111 One of the most ardent opponents of this view would be Judge Cassese who stated that "[w]henever 
reference to national law is not commanded expressly, or imposed by necessary implication, resort to 
national legislation is not warranted": Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovié, Case No. IT-96-22, Appeals 
Chamber, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, 7 October 1997, para. 3 [Erdemovié, Judge 
Cassese]. Where national laws must be considered, Judge Cassese notes that "the normal attitude of 
international courts is to try to assimilate or transform the national law notion so as to adjust it to the 
exigencies and basic principles of internationallaw": ibid. 
112 Furundiija, Judge Robinson, supra note 89, para. 281. 
113 Ibid., paras. 285-6 [emphasis added]. 
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The serious implication of wholesale importation of general public international law 
interpretive doctrines into the international criminal law tradition has aIso been largely 
unexplored. While a comparative analysis of Articles 31-32 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties and national criminal law interpretive doctrines is beyond the scope 
of the present analysis, it suffices to recognize that important variances exist, flowing 
from the basic fact that international mIes of interpretation are of general application to 
disputes between States and do not typically involve the liberty interest of individuals. 
These international interpretive doctrines are intended to be exhaustive, authorizing 
extensive use of supplementary materials where required. The consequences. of these 
realizations for international criminal proceedings have already been apparent at the 
ICTY. 
Defence Counsel in Hadiihasanovié challenged the use of Articles 31 and 32 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties before the ICTY Appeals Chamber. In that 
case, it was argued that "the object and purpose of the [ICTY] Statute cannot be relied 
upon to determine whether command responsibility in the context of internaI armed 
conflicts was law in 1993".114 The unspoken assumption in this statement relates back to 
the seemingly irreconcilable aims of extending humanitarian protection and ensuring full 
respect for the rights of the accused. In that case, Defence Counsel implicitly argued that 
the U.N. Security Council did not have the power to criminalize behavior that was not 
, 
illegal at the time, even if it would extend humanitarian protection, because it would 
violate the principle of legality. 
114 Prosecutor v. Enver Hadiihasanovié et al., Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Appeals Chamber, Interloeutory 
Appeal on Decision on Joint Challenge to Jurisdietion, 27 November 2002, paras. 94-6 (Defenee Motion). 
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In a Partial Dissenting Opinion in this case, Judge Shabuddeen explicitly discussed the 
relationship between the interpretive rules set out in the Vien na Convention on the Law of 
Treaties and the maxim in dubio pro reo ('uncertainty in the law must be interpreted in 
favour of the accused'). Due to the relative exhaustiveness of international interpretive 
doctrines, the maxim which is a fundamental interpretive principle in many national 
systems was essentially eviscerated - demonstrating the repercussions of relying on 
public internationallaw interpretive canons to resolve international criminallaw issues: 
Paragraph 120 of the interlocutory appeal pleads that '(u)ncertainty in the law must be 
interpreted in favour of the accused'. As 1 understand the injunctions of the maxim in 
dubio pro reo and of the associated princip le of strict construction in criminal 
proceedings, those injunctions operate on the result produced by a particular method of 
interpretation but do not necessarily control the selection of the method. The selection of 
the method in this case is governed by the rules of interpretation laid down in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. It is only if the application of the method of 
interpretation prescribed by the Convention results in a doubt which cannot be resolved 
by recourse to the provisions of the Convention itself - an unlikely proposition - that the 
maxim applies so as to prefer the meaning which is more favourable to the accused. In my 
view, that is not the position here: there is no residual doubt. 115 
International Human Rights Law as a Dynamic Normative Force 
The development of international human rights law after WWII, developed and codified 
in large measure through international treaties, has played a significant and ongoing role 
in generating norms that have infused the international criminal law tradition since the 
advent of the modem ad hoc tribunals. The ICTY Trial Chamber went so far as to state 
in Furundiija that "[t]he general principle of respect for human dignity is the basic 
underpinning and indeed the very raison d'être of international humanitarian law and 
115 Prosecutor v. Enver Hadiihasanovié and Amir Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Appeals Chamber, 
Partial Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shabuddeen: Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Challenging 
Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, 16 July 2003, para. 12. 
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human rights law; indeed in modem times it has become of such paramount importance 
as to permeate the whole body ofinternationallaw.,,1l6 
Only after the creation of the United Nations were a litany of treaties adopted and 
resolutions passed to expand the body of international human rights law. By the time of 
the creation of the modem ad hoc tribunals, international standards for the fair and proper 
conduct of criminal proceedings in national courts had already taken on a transnational 
character, making it impossible for these international criminal tribunals to ignore these 
standards. 117 These norms continue to develop over time, evolving independently of 
international criminal proceedings, and doing so in international human rights bodies, 
regional human rights courts and national courts. For example, the Statutes of the modem 
ad hoc tribunals which were adopted by the U.N. Security Council include detailed 
provisions guaranteeing the rights of the accused which are largely taken from Article 14 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 1l8 In this respect, 
considering international human rights law as merely persuasive 'information' exchanged 
with international criminal law appears to understate its normative force. The ability of 
this body of human rights law to develop international criminal law, in particular 
international criminal evidence and procedure, has already been postulated in very strong 
terms. As will be seen later, it also raises its head in cases of ambiguity in substantive 
116 Prosecutor v. Anto Furundiija, Case No. IT -95-17 /1-T, Trial Chamber, Judgement, 10 December 1998, 
para. 183. 
117 Salvatore Zappalà, Human Rights in International Criminal Proceedings (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003) at 245-7. 
118 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 
(No. 16) at 52, D.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 D.N.T.S. 171, art. 14; see ICTY Statute, supra note 47, art. 
21 and ICTR Statute, supra note 47, art. 20. 
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international criminallaw, in particular questions of specifie application of international 
humanitarian law. 
With respect to criminal procedure and evidence, Richard May and Marieke Wierda have 
argued that trial fairness, as understood in international human rights law, has been the 
motivating factor at the modem ad hoc tribunals to reconcile differences in nationallegal 
traditions. They also argue that regional human rights law, in particular as expounded by 
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Ruman Rights, has proven to provide a 
powerful normative source of international cri minai law princip/es of evidence and 
procedure, such as the concept of equality of armsy9 Christoph Safferling takes the 
argument one step further, arguing that the only way to bridge the gap between common 
and civilian legal traditions at the international level is "to find a consensus in a truly 
international criminal procedure that aIl states can accept. In order to achieve this, the 
discussion must begin with what states have already accepted, that is, univers al human 
rights.,,120 This suggests that there is added strength on the side of ensuring fairness to 
the accused in the international criminal law tradition, perhaps at the cost of extending 
humanitarian protection - the other competing tension. Indeed, the normative thrust of 
international human rights law has now been formaIly entrenched in Article 21 (3) of the 
Rome Statute of the ICC, which is discussed in detail in Chapter 3, as part ofthis broader 
trend in international criminal law. This provision states that "[t]he application and 
119 May & Wierda, 1999, supra note 18 at 728, 733, n. 22. 
120 Christoph J. M. Safferling, Towards an International Criminal Procedure (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001) at 367. 
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interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent with internationally 
recognized human rights [ ... ]".121 
Filling Gaps in Applicable Law in Practice 
Moving from the theoretical towards a more empirical analysis, a selective review of the 
jurisprudence of the modem ad hoc tribunals demonstrates that real gaps have arisen in 
practice by simply resorting to the public international law sources and interpretive 
doctrines discussed above. This inquiry is relevant for three purposes. First, it suggests 
that the balance in the international criminal law tradition between extending 
humanitarian protection and maximizing the protections of the accused has been highly 
variable. Secondly, it shows that lacunae in international criminallaw do not exist merely 
~ .. where there is no definition of applicable law, as was the case in Chapter 1 concerning its 
early origins, but rather are a systematic concern that has not been addressed by the 
adoption of a de facto articulation of the applicable law (i.e. Article 38(1) of the lCJ 
Statute, discussed above). Therefore, there is no basis to assume that a de jure 
articulation of sources of law, as in Article 21 of the Rome Statute, will definitively 
address this concern. 122 
Thirdly, this inquiry demonstrates that problems arising from the hybrid character of 
international criminallaw have been deal with, at least in part, by judges at the modem ad 
hoc tribunals treating national laws as constituting transnational co mm on laws (as 
described by Glenn above) which the judges have drawn upon based on their persuasive 
121 ICC Statute, supra note 37, art. 21(3). 
122 This specifie hypothesis is examined in Chapter 3. 
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force. In this way, Article 21(1)(c) of the Rome Statute, discussed in Chapter 3, can be 
seen to reflect a codification of this approach which eschews the prospect of deriving 
rules of international custom from national laws, in favour of "general principles of law 
derived by the Court from nationallaws of legal systems of the world". 123 Over time, the 
cumulative effect of international judicial decision-making on this basis is a body of 
persuasive jurisprudence, such that resort to national laws has become less and less 
necessary at the modem ad hoc tribunals. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, this process 
of building an international criminallaw tradition on the basis of persuasive, non-binding 
decisions has been entrenched in Article 21 (2) of the Rome Statute.124 
Problems in Identijjing International eustom 
The ICTY Appeals Chamber's decision on jurisdiction in Tadié is a foundational case in 
many respects for the modem ad hoc tribunals, not the least of which is because it is one 
of the very first decisions rendered by an international criminal tribunal since the post-
WWII proceedings. This decision also affords a typical example of the way in which 
these tribunals have approached the task of invoking various sources of law to resolve 
questions that are not answered in the formaI law of these tribunals (i.e. the relevant 
statutory provisions in their Statutes, and Rules of Procedure and Evidence). 
In Tadié, the ICTY Appeals Chamber held that violations of customary rules governing 
internaI armed conflicts may incur individual criminal responsibility. It reached this 
123 ICC Statute, supra note 37, art. 2 1 (1)(c) [emphasis added]. 
124 "The Court may apply principles and mIes of law as interpreted in its previous decisions"; ibid., art. 
21(2) [emphasis added]. 
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conclusion, inter alia, extending the rule in international armed conflicts established by 
the IMT by implicitly invoking the Martens clause, stating: "[p ]rinciples and rules of 
humanitarian law reflect 'elementary considerations of humanity' widely recognized as 
the mandatory minimum for conduct in armed conflicts of any kind. No one can doubt the 
gravit y of the acts at issue, nor the interest of the international community in their 
prohibition.,,125 Placing the Martens Clause, whose role in international criminallaw had 
been historically challenged as discussed in Chapter 1, so centrally in this decision has the 
effect of inserting a dynarnic normative vehicle for extending hurnanitarian protection in 
international criminal law, clearly at the expense of the competing interests of ensuring 
fairness to the accused. Without the Tadié decision on jurisdiction, virtually all of the 
indictments issued by the ICTY would be a nullity. 
The ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadié further added that customary international law 
arrives at the same conclusion. State practice in the following jurisdictions was cited: 
Belgium (statute), Germany (military manual), New Zealand (military manual), United 
States (military manual), United Kingdom (military manual), former Socialist Federal 
Republic ofYugoslavia (criminal code), the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (decree 
law) , and Nigeria (military manual, court martial and civilian court decisions).126 With 
respect to opinio juris, the Appeals Charnber relied solely on several U.N. Security 
Council resolutions regarding the situation in Somalia.127 The parties to the conflict in 
125 Tadié, Appeals Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 78, para. 129. 
126 Ibid.,paras. 106,125,130,131. 
127 Ibid., para. 133. 
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/~. Bosnia-Herzegovina were also found to have agreed in a treaty to punish violations of 
international humanitarian law committed in the internaI armed conflict. 128 
The approach of the ICTY to finding this very significant rule of customary international 
law can hardly be classified as rigorous, neither in depth nor breadth of analysis. Only 
eight jurisdictions were considered, just one of which was a non-Western country. The 
persuasiveness of relying so heavily on the State practice of jurisdictions which have not 
had to deal with internaI armed conflicts is troubling. Other than in the Nigerian law 
analysis, there is only cursory citation of provisions in military manuals or national 
legislation, without any doctrinal support or analysis to lend credibility to the ICTY's 
interpretation of these provisions. Again, other than a few Nigerian cases, the actual uses 
of the legislative provisions that exist to purportedly punish violations of international 
humanitarian law in internaI armed conflict are absent. Furthermore, no link is made 
whatsoever between State practice, on the one hand, and opinio juris on the other. They 
are disjunctively treated - not linked in either time or jurisdictional space. 
Similar observations apply at the ICTR, as in Kabiligi. In that case, Defence Counsel 
claimed, inter alia, that the indictment was defective on the grounds that it dealt with 
allegations before the temporal jurisdiction of the ICTR. The Trial Chamber decided that 
"[a]s to the conspiracy charge, the Trial Chamber finds that the limited temporal 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal does not bar evidence of an alleged conspiracy of which the 
128 Ibid., para. 136. 
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agreement was made before 1994.,,129 In arriving at this conclusion, the ICTR Trial 
Chamber relied on an Australian doctrinal text, case law of the House of Lords, and a 
decision of a U.S. military tribunal. Based on these sources of law, the ICTR Trial 
Chamber concluded that the law on conspiracy as it applies to temporal jurisdiction was 
"clear from the authorities" .130 
The foregoing critique is significant because it fundamentally questions the theoretical 
basis for seeking out customary international law ru/es to be applied in the international 
criminal law tradition. It also suggests that the balance in this tradition between 
extending humanitarian protection versus maximizing princip les of a fair defence has 
been strongly influenced by developments in international humanitarian law and 
international human rights law - a trend confirmed by the Erdemovié case, discussed 
below. 
Reconciling Differences between National Legal Traditions 
A critical review of the jurisprudence of the modem ad hoc tribunals reveals many 
instances where these judges were required to answer questions which were unaddressed 
in their formallaw (i.e. their Statutes, and Rules of Procedure and Evidence) by resorting 
to nationallaws - which themselves were vastly different or seen to be in conflict. Given 
such a divergence or conflict among national legal sources, it cannot be argued that these 
judges were applying international customary law, or 'general principles of law'. Yet, 
129 Prosecutor v. Gratien Kabiligi and Aloys Ntabakuze, Case No. ICTR-96-34-I, Trial Chamber, Decision 
on the Defence Motions Objecting to a Lack of Jurisdiction and Seeking to Declare the Indictment Void Ab 
Initio, 13 April 2000, para. 39. 
130 Ibid., para. 43. 
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they nevertheless arrived at a definitive staternent of the law, sornetirnes opting to follow 
one legal tradition over another, and at other tirnes, fashioning their own articulation of 
the appropriate rule. This body of practice offers strong evidence of a basic elernent of 
the international crirninal law tradition: that it is largely based on judicial discretion in 
difficult cases, exercised consistent with Glenn's theory of transnational cornrnon laws, 
often based on favouring either extending hurnanitarian protection or enhancing fairness 
to the accused. 
The ICTY Trial Charnber decision on hearsay in Tadié is paradigrnatic of the above 
hypothesis. In that case, the parties disagreed on whether the cornrnon law or civilian 
approach to resolving this legal question, which was not explicitly addressed in the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence, should prevail. Defence Counsel recognized that national 
rules of evidence do not bind the ICTY, but argued that the adversarial system of trial is 
more sirnilar to cornrnon law jurisdictions which generally presurnptively exclude hearsay 
evidence, with exceptions only where its probative value substantially outweighs its 
prejudicial effects. l3l On the other side, the Prosecution argued that the ICTY judges are 
finders of fact in a rnanner akin to professional civilian judges, where aIl relevant 
evidence is generally adrnissible.132 In resolving this impasse, the Trial Charnber noted 
that there was no general rule excluding hearsay in the ICTY Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, and cited Rule 89, discussed earlier. 133 The Trial Charnber proceeded to 
examine the divergent civilian and cornrnon law approaches to hearsay evidence, and 
131 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadié, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber, Decision on Defence Motion on 
Hearsay, 5 August 1996, para. 2 [Tadié, Hearsay Decision; on file with author]. 
132 Ibid., para. 3. 
133 Ibid., paras. 4-6. 
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noted that the ICTY itself is a "unique amalgam of civil and common law features" .134 ln 
articulating its approach under international criminal law to hearsay evidence, the Trial 
Chamber stated that it would admit relevant evidence which has probative value, 
"focusing on its reliability,,135 such that it "may be guided by, but not bound to, hearsay 
exceptions generally recognized by sorne nationallegal systems". 136 Therefore, the Trial 
Chamber developed a sui generis137 articulation of the law on hearsay by drawing from 
both common law and civilian traditions - but not adopting either completely - and 
justified this approach as falling within the scope of its Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
and being "the most efficient and fair method".138 Indeed, a recent survey of ICTY and 
ICTR evidentiary law jurisprudence has confirmed the view that judges play a prominent 
law-making role in reconciling national legal traditions. 139 There was no attempt by the 
ICTY Trial Chamber to justify its solution as being a 'rule of international customary 
law' or 'general principle oflaw'. The Tadié decision on hearsay may thus be viewed as 
a case of reconciling national legal traditions which are non-binding, but persuasive 
sources of law for international criminallaw. 
ln the Erdemovié decision on duress, it was not simply the parties, but also the judges of 
the ICTY Appeals Chamber which were split on whether duress constituted a complete 
134 Ibid, para. 14. 
135 Ibid., para. 19. 
136 Ibid. 
137 This language was not formally used until the DelaUé case: see Prosecutor v. Zejnil DelaUé, Case No. 
IT -96-21-T, Trial Chamber, Decision on the Motion on Presentation of Evidence by the Accused, May 1, 
1997. 
138 Tadié, Hearsay Decision, supra note 131, para. 19. 
139 See May & Wierda, 1999, supra note 18 at 727: "Thus, the presentation of evidence has followed the 
'adversarial' mode l, whereas the mIes goveming the admissibility of evidence may be seen as more akin to 
the 'inquisitorial' model and leave wide discretion to the judges." 
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defence to war crimes or crimes against humanity involving the 'killing of innocent 
people'. The five-member panel agreed that this question was unresolved in the ICTY 
Statute, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and international treaties. They also agreed 
that there was a rift between civilian jurisdictions that permitted duress as a complete 
defence to aU offences, and common law jurisdictions that generaUy denied duress in 
cases of murder, but treated it as a mitigating factor at sentencing. Despite this 
consensus, there was deep division in the Appeals Chamber regarding the basis on which 
the issue should be resolved, and four separate opinions were rendered. 
The majority in Erdemovié, composed of Judge McDonald, Judge Vohrah and Judge Li 
found "that duress does not afford a complete defence to a soldier charged with a crime 
against humanity and/or a war crime involving the killing of innocent human beings.,,140 
They resolved the gap in international criminal law by explicitly resorting to 'practical 
poHcy considerations', namely the imperative of extending humanitarian protection to 
deny duress as a defence to the killing of innocent people. Judge Cassese and Judge 
Stephen dissented, each writing separate opinions. Judge Cassese's denial of ambiguity 
in international criminal law on this issue is suspect, and his admission that if there was 
ambiguity, it should be resolved in favour of the accused is quite telling. For its part, 
Judge Stephen's dissenting opinion mirrors Glenn's theory of transnational common 
laws, with the civilian approach to duress being more persuasive and more suitable to the 
interests of justice. 
140 Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovié, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Judgement, Appeals Chamber, 7 October 1997, 
para. 19. 
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Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah began their analysis by citing Article 38 of the IeJ 
Statute under a heading entitled 'Applicable Law' .141 They turned to consider customary 
internationallaw and then general princip les of law to ascertain whether duress could be a 
defence to the aUeged offence. In evaluating the state of customary international law, 
case law of the post-WWII military tribunals was evaluated. The Einsatzgruppen 
decision of the V.S. Military Tribunal was challenged for failing to cite any authority for 
its statement that duress could be a complete defence, and Judge McDonald and Judge 
Vohrah found it was "in discord with the preponderant view of international 
authorities".142 They also rejected case law from Germany, Belgium, Israel, France, the 
former V.S.S.R., the former Yugoslavia, and Italy which had been offered to support the 
view of duress as a complete defence, stating that these cases "are insufficient to support 
the finding of a customary rule [ ... ] a number of the cases are of questionable relevance 
and authority.,,143 Turning to nationallegislation, they found there was no uniform state 
practice. They observed the clear split between the civil and common law tradition on 
this issue. Defence Counsel provided evidence that at least fourteen civil law 
jurisdictions (including the former Yugoslavia) permit necessity or duress to be 
exculpatory for aU crimes. 144 However, Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah noted that 
141 Erdemovié, Judges McDonald and Vohrah, supra note 35, para. 40. 
142 Ibid, para. 44. The D.S. Military Tribunal had held as follows: "Let it be said at once that there is no law 
which requires that an innocent man must forfeit his life or suffer serious harm in order to avoid comm,itting 
a crime which he condemns. The threat, however, must be imminent, real and inevitable. No court will 
punish a man who, with a loaded pistol at his head, is compelled to pull a lethallever.": cited in ibid, para. 
43. 
143 Ibid, para. 48. 
144 The jurisdictions included Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Greece, Italy, Finland, the Netherlands, France, 
Germany, Peru, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden and the former Yugoslavia: ibid, para. 49. 
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common law jurisdictions reject duress as a defence to murder, with the exception of "a 
few states" in the United States.145 
Turning to general principles of law, differences between civilian, common law, and 
'other' systems (e.g. Japan, China, Morocco, Somalia, and Ethiopia) were provided. After 
this basic review, Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah engaged in a more detailed 
assessment of how duress operates in civilian jurisdictions in practice. However, they 
were unable to reconcile the diverse approaches in nationallaw, stating: 
It is clear from the differing positions of the principal le gal systems ofthe world that there 
is no consistent concrete role which answers the question whether or not duress is a 
defence to the killing of innocent persons. It is not possible to reconcile the opposing 
positions and, indeed, we do not believe that the issue should be reduced to a contest 
between common law and civillaw. 146 
To set out an 'applicable rule' governing duress in the case, Judge McDonald and Judge 
Vohrah appealed to the "normative mandate of international criminal law". 147 In so 
doing, they explicitly opted to decide the case based on extending humanitarian 
protection (arguably at the expense of ensuring fairness to the accused), stating: 
we are operating in the realm of international humanitarian law which has, as one of its 
prime objectives, the protection of the weak and vulnerable in such a situation where their 
lives and security are endangered [ ... ] It must be our concern to facilitate the 
development and effectiveness of international humanitarian law and to promote its aims 
and application by recognising the normative effect which criminallaw should have upon 
those subject to them. 148 
A fundamental tension in the international criminallaw tradition is at the very crux of this 
'tough case' in which a clear gap existed in the existing corpus of international criminal 
145 Ibid, para. 49. 
146 Ibid, para. 72. 
147 Ibid, para. 73. 
148 Ibid, para. 75. 
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law. While rejecting duress as a defence on the basis of the policy behind international 
humanitarian law, Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah still gave sorne credence to the 
competing tension in international criminallaw with respect to fairness to the accused, by 
stating that duress can operate as a mitigating factor at sentencing. 149 It must be stressed 
that it was not international humanitarian law itself which provided the answer for Judge 
McDonald and Judge Vohrah, indeed it is silent on criminal defences, but rather the 
general policy behind international humanitarian law. These judges were unapologetic in 
their explanation of the final basis for their decision to deny duress as a defence to the 
offences alleged, indicating it is not grounded, strictly speaking, in pre-existing law: 
We do not think our reference to considerations ofpolicy are improper. It would be naive 
to believe that international law operates and develops wholly divorced from 
considerations of social and economic policy [ ... ] The approach we take does not involve 
a balancing ofharms for and against killing but rests upon an application in the context of 
international humanitarian law of the mIe that duress does not justify or excuse the killing 
of an innocent person. 150 
Similarly, Judge Li's concurring opinion was founded largely on extending humanitarian 
protection, but also explicitly drew on those nationallaws which are 'best suited' to the 
context of the case. This approach demonstrated resort to the persuasiveness of 
transnational common laws, such that "this International Tribunal cannot but opt for the 
solution best suited for the protection of innocent persons.,,151 The majority decision in 
Erdemovié, therefore, cannot be said to be grounded in Article 38(1) of the IeJ Statute-
these general doctrines of public international law having failed to provide an answer to 
the fundamental question at stake in Erdemovié, at least according to the majority's 
reasoning. 
149 See ibid., paras. 86-7. 
150 Ibid., paras. 78, 80. 
151 Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovié, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Li, 
Appeals Chamber, 7 October 1997, para. 8. 
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On the other side of the debate, Judge Cassese held in his dissenting opinion that 
"international criminallaw on duress is not ambiguous or uncertain".152 He proceeded by 
identifying four conditions which must be satisfied in order for duress to provide a 
defence under international criminal law, based on "relevant case-Iaw [that] is almost 
unanimous,,153 (i.e. severity of threat, no means of escape, proportionality of me ans taken, 
and threat not self-induced). The 'relevant case-Iaw' cited by Judge Cassese consisted of 
several decisions of the post-WWII military tribunal s, and national de ci si ons from the 
Netherlands, Israel and Canada. 154 These provided, according to Judge Cassese's 
reasoning for a 'general rule' of customary international law that duress may offer a 
defence to an accused. Judge Cassese described the Prosecution as attempting to fashion 
an 'exception' in customary internationallaw to disallow duress as a defence for offences 
involving the 'killing of innocent persons' .155 Judge Cassese argued that the "manifest 
inconsistency of State practice warrants the dismissal of the Prosecution's contention: no 
special customary rule has evolved in international law on whether or not duress can be 
admitted as a defence in case of crimes involving the killing of pers ons" .156 The logic 
applied by Judge Cassese on this point is quite malleable and, therefore, suspect. It could 
just as easily be argued that a 'general rule' of international criminal law is that the 
individual criminal responsibility of an accused can only be negated or excused based on 
a defence recognized under internationallaw. Since duress is not recognized as a defence 
152 Erdemovié, Judge Cassese, supra note 111, para. 49. 
153 Ibid, para. 16. 
154 Ibid., n. 10. 
155 Ibid, para. 18. 
156 Ibid, para. 40. 
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to the offences charged, and Judge Cassese falls short of finding a 'specifie rule' 
permitting duress as a defence to the 'killing of innocent persons', then the purported 
defence would not exist. 
Judge Cassese is harsh in his criticism of the majority opinions, which he characterized as 
being based solely on 'extraneous' public policy considerations: 
the majority of the Appeals Chamber has embarked upon a detailed investigation of 
'practical policy considerations' and has concluded by upholding 'policy considerations' 
substantially based on English law. 1 submit that this examination is extraneous to the task 
of our Tribunal. This International Tribunal is called upon to apply internationallaw, in 
particular our Statute and princip les and roles of international humanitarian law and 
international criminallaw. Our International Tribunal is a court of law; it is bound only 
by international law. It should therefore refrain from engaging in meta-Iegal analyses. 
[ ... ] What is even more important, a policy-oriented approach in the area of criminallaw 
runs contrary to the fundamental customary principle nullum crimen sine lege. 157 
While rejecting 'policy considerations' as a relevant basis of decisions by international 
criminal tribunals, later in his dissenting opinion Judge Cassese nevertheless buttresses 
his position in a section entitled 'Concluding considerations' by invoking what could 
reasonably be called policy considerations, stating: "Law is based on what society can 
reasonably expect of its members. It should not set intractable standards of behaviour 
which require mankind to perform acts of martyrdom, and brand as criminal any 
behaviour falling below those standards.,,158 
In a very revealing passage, Judge Cassese stated that ifthere was ambiguity or a gap in 
international criminal law concerning duress, then the ICTY should have made 
"appropriate and judicious [ ... ] recourse - as a last resort - to the national legislation of 
the accused, rather than to moral considerations or policy-oriented principles," given that 
157 Ibid., para. Il. 
158 Ibid., para. 47. 
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the accused was "required to know those national provisions and base his expectations on 
their contents".159 However, there is no authority cited by Judge Cassese for filling gaps 
in international criminal law by applying the national law ordinarily applicable to the 
accused. His only justification for this approach is: first, that the accused would have 
known national law; and second, that applying national law is preferable to applying 
princip les of morality or policy considerations. That combatants would have known that 
their nationallaw permitted duress as a defence could only be relevant for the purposes of 
ensuring legal certainty in armed conflict, or ensuring fairness to an accused who acted in 
good faith on what he believed to be legal - Judge Cassese specifically refers to the 
maxim in dubio pro reo in this regard. 160 Holding the accused to two different standards, 
not knowing which would apply, would be 'unfair' the argument would go. These 
considerations, however, which flow from Judge Cassese's reasoning are all arguably 
'policy considerations' which he has strenuously argued are generally erroneous before 
international tribunals. Therefore, we are brought back to the intractable tension in the 
international criminal law tradition between extending humanitarian protection, versus 
ensuring fairness to the accused. 
In the final dissenting OpInIOn in Erdemovié, Judge Stephen began by disputing the 
persuasive authority of the post-WWII jurisprudence on the grounds that they merely 
applied the national law that the judges of those courts were most familiar with,161 a 
159 Ibid., para. 49. 
160 Ibid. 
161 Judge Stephen held: "The post-Second World War military tribunals do not appear to have acted in 
relation to duress in conscious conformity with the dictates of international law": Erdemovié, Judge 
Stephen, supra note 68, para. 24. 
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general contention examined in Chapter 1. Judge Stephen then turned to examine general 
principles of law as articulated in Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute, agreeing with the 
theoretical approach articulated by Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah regarding the 
ability of general principles to fill lacunae in international law. 162 Characterizing the 
divergence of the common law and civilian tradition on this issue, Judge Stephen simply 
indicated preference for the latter and justified this decision based on favouring the 
tension within international criminal law of ensuring fairness to the accused: "not only 
because of the approach of the civil law but also as a matter of simple justice [ ... ] In 
searching for a general principle of law the enquiry must go beyond the actual rules and 
must seek the reason for their creation and the manner of their application.,,163 Later, 
Judge Stephen rejected the competing tension in international criminallaw of extending 
humanitarian protection on the facts of the case as alleged, arguing that it "is not achieved 
by the denial of a just defence to one who is in no position to effect by his own will the 
protection of innocent life.,,164 This reasoning shows hints of a rare attempt to reconcile 
the competing aims of international criminallaw. 
Judge Stephen proceeded to attack the common law position, interestingly by relying on 
sorne common law jurisprudence and doctrine itself which admits that there is an 
"absence in the common law of any satisfying and reasoned principle governing the 
exclusion of duress in the case of very serious crimes including murder".165 Judge 
Stephen also sought to distinguish the common law position since it is "based upon 
162 Ibid, para. 25. 
163 Ibid, paras. 26, 63 [emphasis added]. 
164 Ibid, para. 65. 
165 Ibid, paras. 29ff. 
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situations in which an accused has had a choice between his own life and the life of 
another as distinct from cases where an accused has no such choice, it being a case of 
either death for one or death for both.,,166 
However, in a series of questionable moves, Judge Stephen seeks to dec1are a general 
principle of law recognizing duress as a defence on that basis that a "general princip le 
governing duress is therefore more likely to be found in these general rules [i.e. civilian 
rules] than in specific exceptions which exist for particular crimes [i.e. common law 
rules].,,167 With respect, this is merely a play-on-words with the word 'general' in 
'general principles of law'. The existence of exceptions to rules of law in national 
systems cannot reasonably invalidate those nationallaws from analysis - to the contrary 
their divergence from other approaches which do not recognize such exceptions make it 
more difficult to dec1are a general principle of law exists. Based on the preceding 
analysis, Judge Stephen purported to dec1are a narrow general principle of law that could 
perhaps enable duress to operate on the facts alleged by the accused in the case: 
despite the exception which the common law makes to the availability of duress in cases 
of murder where the choice is truly between one life or another, the defence of duress can 
be adopted into international law as deriving from a general princip le of law recognized 
by the world's major legal systems, at least where that exception does not apply [i.e. as in 
this case where the choice was allegedly between one life being lost or both being 108t].168 
The Erdemovié decision, therefore, represents a microcosm for the development of the 
international criminal law tradition, bringing to light its fundamental tensions and basic 
aspects which began with its origins at Nuremberg and have only grown more apparent in 
166 Ibid., para. 25. 
167 Ibid., para. 63. 
168 Ibid., para. 66. 
62 
Development of the International Criminal Law Tradition 
concrete cases at the modem ad hoc tribunals. It is a harbinger of the very type of 
elementary questions regarding the guilt or acquittaI of an accused which will continue to 
faU within the gaps in international criminallaw. 
Non-Binding Nature of Transnational Common Laws 
While the cases discussed above have dealt with instances where the modem ad hoc 
tribunals have fiUed lacunae by relying on the persuasive force of transnational common 
laws, often by choosing between favouring humanitarian protection or fairness to the 
accused, it is equaUy important to examine the truly non-binding nature of these 
transnational common laws by showing cases where they have been deliberately set 
aside. 169 Richard May and Marieke Wierda confirm this view, arguing that international 
criminal law must not be exclusively grounded in common or civilian law, "or even a 
combination of the two" .170 Thus, even where transnational common laws, such as the 
common laws of Europe,171 are in complete agreement, they may be denied normative 
force. This is a further element of establishing that the concept of transnational common 
laws may be the dominant explanatory theory behind the international criminal law 
tradition. Sorne clear evidence of this kind is provided in the ICTR Appeal Chamber 
decision in Bagosora. 
169 This concept has also been codified, in part, in Rule 89(A) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of 
these tribunaIs, cited earlier, which denies binding authority to national evidentiary law: ICTY RuIes, supra 
note 48, r. 89(A): "A Chamber shaH apply the rules of evidence set forth in this Section, and shaH not be 
bound by national rules of evidence." ICTR RuIes, supra note 48, r. 89(A): "The rules of evidence set forth 
in this Section shaH govem the proceedings before the Chambers. The Chambers shaH not be bound by 
national rules of evidence." 
170 May & Wierda, 1999, supra note 18 at 728. 
17l See Glenn, On Common Laws, supra note 98 at c. 1. 
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In that case, the Prosecutor argued that there was an inherent right of appeal against the 
decision of the confirming judge to dismiss the indictment. Among other arguments, the 
Prosecutor unsuccessfully sought to rely on provisions in national jurisdictions in both 
civilian and common law systems as evidence of a general principle of law. The 
reasoning of the ICTR Appeals Chamber in rejecting this argument is not easily 
understood without resort to Glenn's theory of transnational common laws: 
46. The Prosecutor submits that an inherent right of appeal may be founded on the 
practice of courts in national jurisdictions. It is argued that a survey of national law 
indicates the existence of a general princip le of law that, in the absence of an express 
provision to the contrary, a right of appeal generally lies from the decisions of a lower 
court. The Prosecutor cites provisions from the Codes of Criminal Procedure of the civil 
law jurisdictions of France, Senegal and Germany, where decisions of lower courts 
dismissing an indictment may always be appealed to a superior court, and the remedies of 
mandamus and certiorari in the common law jurisdictions of the United States and the 
United Kingdom. 
47. In the view of the Prosecutor, the Appeals Chamber may extrapolate an analogue of 
such rules to find jurisdiction in the instant appeal. The Prosecutor argues that general 
principles of law may be applied by international courts, citing, inter alia, Article 38 of 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice and the jurisprudence of the ICTY. 
48. The Appeals Chamber notes, however, that each of the rules cited by the Prosecutor is 
based on an explicit statutory provision in the national jurisdiction concerned. The 
Appeals Chamber, therefore, finds them inapplicable in the instant matter. 172 
If we take the ICTR Appeals Chamber's reasons in Bagosora at face value, it is difficult 
to envisage a situation where it could ever fill lacunae in its Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence by resort to general principles of law. The fact that the rules governing inherent 
rights of appeal are codified in nationallegislation, as opposed to sorne other form such as 
case law, is entirely irrelevant. Indeed, if an international criminal tribunal should 
generally completely ignore nationallaws simply on account of their codification (which 
is different from considering them and finding them unpersuasive), it would be prohibited 
from considering the civilian legal tradition, and indeed, many common law jurisdictions 
172 Bagosora, Appeals Decision, supra note 92, paras. 46-9 [footnotes omitted]. 
64 
Development of the International Criminal Law Tradition 
which have codified much of their criminal law. Therefore, the reasons of the ICTR 
Appeals Chamber in Bagosora must be recast: its true reasons for denying an inherent 
right of appeal are opaque or hidden, much in the way that certain decisions made by the 
IMT were not fully reasoned, as discussed in Chapter 1. Bagosora can be understood as 
affirming the non-binding nature of transnational common laws. While it may be that 
accord among these transnational common laws would typically make them more 
persuasive, this never excludes the possibility that international judges may refuse to 
follow them. Such an outcome is fully accommodated in Glenn's the ory of transnational 
common laws. 
Precedence and an International Criminal Jurisprudence 
Once they have been made, what role do national and international judicial decisions play 
in the international criminal law tradition? Consistent with Glenn's the ory of 
transnational common laws, we would expect them to play a persuasive, but non-binding 
role. This is largely the approach which has been taken at the modern ad hoc tribunals. 
With respect to judicial decisions made outside its Chambers, the ICTY has not 
considered itself to be 'bound' by the decisions of other international courts or tribunals 
such as the IMT or IMTFE,173 but stated that these are merely more persuasive than 
national decisions: 
In sum, international criminal courts such as the International Tribunal must always 
carefully appraise decisions of other courts before relying on their persuasive authority as 
to existing law. Moreover, they should apply a stricter level of scrutiny to national 
decisions than to international judgements, as the latter are at least based on the same 
173 Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskié, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Chamber, Judgement, 14 January 2000, 
para. 540 [Kuprdkié, Trial Judgement]. 
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corpus of law as that applied by international courts, whereas the former tend to apply 
nationallaw, or primarily that law, or el se interpret international rules through the prism 
ofnationallegislation. 174 
What of its own jurisprudence? The treatment given to prior decisions of the Trial and 
Appeals Chambers of the modem ad hoc tribunals is not explicitly addressed in either 
their Statutes or Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 175 This situation presents a dilemma 
given the position on this issue of various streams which feed into the international 
criminal law tradition. While higher courts in the common law tradition may bind lower 
courts by their decisions, there is no similar legal requirement in civilian traditions. 176 In 
public international law, as in Article 59 of the l Cl Statute,t 77 binding precedence is not 
strongly conceived. 
In 2000, the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Aleksovski definitively stated that the "ratio 
decidendi of its decisions is binding on Trial Chambers", owing to: the hierarchical 
structure of the tribunal; the need to ensure "certainty and predictability in the application 
of the applicable law" (similar wording to Control Council Law No. 10, discussed in 
Chapter 1); fairness to the accused because like cases must be treated alike (favouring one 
of the fundamental poles in the international criminal law tradition); and the intention of 
the U.N. Security Council in creating the tribunals which "envisaged a tribunal 
comprising three trial chambers and one appeals chamber, applying a single, unified, 
174 Ibid., para. 542. 
175 Claire Harris, "Precedence in the Practice of the ICTY" in May, supra note 1 08 at 341. 
176 Discussed in Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgement, 24 
March 2000, para. 112 [Aleksovski, Appeals Judgement]. 
177 ICJ Statute, supra note 31, art. 59: "The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the 
parties and in respect ofthat particular case." 
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coherent and rational corpus of law.,,178 With respect to decisions of Trial Chambers, the 
Appeals Chamber essentially adopted the shared common law and civilian approach, 
stating that other Trial Chambers may find such decisions to be persuasive, but that they 
have "no binding force on each other". 179 
The fundamental question of whether the Appeals Chamber is bound by its own prior 
decisions was also addressed in Aleksovski, where the Prosecution argued for the common 
law position of stare decisis which is only departed from if a previous decision is 'c1early 
erroneous and cannot stand', even though it was recognized that this is not a general 
principle of law. On the other hand, the Defence argued that "the Tribunal may apply 
only rules of international humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt part of 
customary law, and the Report [of the U.N. Secretary General creating the ICTY] makes 
no mention of judicial precedence as a source of law.,,180 Resolving this question, the 
Appeals Chamber observed that the "trend which emerges from an examination of 
common law jurisdictions is that their highest courts will normally consider themselves 
bound by their previous decisions, but reserve the right to depart from them in certain 
circumstances.,,181 While the highest courts in civilian jurisdictions tend in practice to 
follow their prior decisions, the Appeals Chamber noted that this is not because such 
decisions are viewed as binding. 182 International courts similarly do not have a notion of 
binding precedence, but afford their prior decisions significant weight. The Appeals 
178 Aleksovski, Appeals Judgement, supra note 176, para. 113. 
179 Ibid., para. 114. 
180 Harris, supra note 175 at 346. 
181 Aleksovski, Appeals Judgement, supra note 176, para. 92. 
182 Ibid., para. 93. 
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Chamber found this practice to be non-determinative, and instead resolved the issue based 
on the need for "certainty, stability and predictability in criminallaw", 183 and the right of 
the accused to a fair trial which includes the right of appeal where like cases are treated 
alike as weIl as where errors of law in past appellate decisions are corrected. 184 The 
ultimate rule adopted in Aleksovski, therefore, was that "the Appeals Chamber should 
follow its previous decisions, but should be free to depart from them for cogent reasons in 
the interests ofjustice.,,185 
Taken together, the approach of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Aleksovski to the nature of 
prior Appeals Chamber decisions to other Trial Chambers, and subsequent Appeals 
Chambers, may be seen as an attempt to reconcile the typically competing aspects of the 
international criminal law tradition. By ensuring Appeals Chambers' decisions are 
binding on Trial Chambers, and should generally be followed by subsequent Appeals 
Chambers, international criminal law can develop over time and be applied clearly and 
concisely, thus enhancing humanitarian protection. Likewise, the rule encourages 
fairness to the accused by ensuring that like cases are treated alike, but allows for the 
exception that a prior Appeals Chamber decision may be disregarded where it is contrary 
to the interests of justice. 
Moving forward, it is pertinent to consider the extent to which the jurisprudence of the 
modern ad hoc tribunals may serve as persuasive, non-binding precedence for the ICC. 
183 Ibid., para. 101. 
184 Ibid., paras. 104-6. 
185 Ibid., para. 107. 
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Only time will tell the answer to this question, but it is already apparent in the Rome 
Statute that sorne of the case law of the modem ad hoc tribunals has been set aside. For 
example, the majority decision in Erdemovié regarding the defence of duress was not 
followed in the drafting of the defences section of the Rome Statute. 186 Furthermore, how 
will the decisions of the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber, Trial Chamber, and Appeals Chamber 
be treated in other cases before the ICC? Article 21(2) of the Rome Statute appears to 
retreat from the approach of the common law tradition and the modem ad hoc tribunal s, 
instead favouring an approach of mere persuasive authority akin to the civilian tradition, 
stating: "[t]he Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous 
decisions.,,187 These issues will be addressed in further detail in Chapter 3. 
Significance of MaturingJudicial Institutional Structure 
The advent of the modem ad hoc tribunals represents a crucial step in the development of 
international criminal law. Their jurisprudence establishes sorne basic continuity with 
key principles from the post-WWII tribunal s, most notably individual criminal 
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law. The judicial 
institutions of the modem ad hoc tribunals have played an important role in advancing 
international criminallaw in several ways. 
First, unlike the IMT which was concerned with only one mega-trial to prosecute 
individuals on one side of an armed conflict, the modem ad hoc tribunals have prosecuted 
186 Geert-Jan Alexander Knoops, An Introduction to the Law of the International Criminal Tribunals 
(Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, Ine., 2003) at 74; see ICC Statute, supra note 37, art. 3 1 (l)(d). 
187 ICC Statute, supra note 37, art. 21(2). 
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dozens of accused on different sides of their respective armed conflicts. These multiple 
proceedings have resulted in hundreds of decisions being made on evidentiary and 
procedural matters, and dozens of landmark judgments on substantive matters of 
international criminal law. This has enabled the refinement and development of 
evidentiary, procedural and substantive law in a way that would not have been possible 
otherwise. The jurisprudence thus represents a growing corpus of international criminal 
law. 
Second, unlike the post-WWII tribunals which were only loosely affiliated and did not 
have an appellate structure, the ICTY and ICTR have a common Appeals Chamber and 
other institutional connections that have facilitated a more coherent development of 
international criminal law. Ilias Bantekas and Susan Nash explain that the "intention 
behind these common institutions was the development of a balanced and coherent 
jurisprudence, which has evidently been achieved.,,188 While they were created as non-
permanent tribunals, the "[t]he creation of the Rwanda Tribunal showed that the 
machinery designed for the Yugoslavia Tribunal could be employed for other specifie 
circumstances and offenses, thereby avoiding the need to reinvent the wheel in response 
to each global humanitarian crisis.,,189 On the other hand, it should be noted that "at least 
one permanent member of the Security Council, China, has openly expressed concern 
188 Ilias Bantekas & Susan Nash, International Criminal Law, 2nd ed. (London: Cavendish Publishing Ltd., 
2003) at 340; see ICTR Statute, supra note 47, art. 12(2). 
189 Michael P. Scharf, "The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadié: An Appraisal of the First International War Crimes 
Trial Since Nuremberg" (1997) 60 Albany Law Review 861 at 880. 
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about using the Yugoslavia Tribunal as precedent for the creation of other ad hoc criminal 
tribunals,,190 
Third, the judges of the modem ad hoc tribunals are not nationals of the victorious parties 
of the armed conflict, or their allies, as was the case with the post-WWII tribunals, but 
rather have been elected by the V.N. General Assembly from nominations provided to the 
V.N. Security Council by Member States, "taking due account of the adequate 
representation of the principallegal systems of the world.,,191 Additionally, guidelines for 
the geographic distribution of staff members in Chambers who advise the judges of the 
modem ad hoc tribunals also helps to ensure that more national laws become accessible 
as a matter of practice to Chambers. The legal tradition from which these judges hail has 
been noted by commentators. For example, in the Tadié decision on hearsay, Richard 
May and Marieke Wierda noted that "[t]his ruling from a Trial Chamber composed of 
essentially common law judges was approved and followed by another Trial Chamber of 
essentially civillaw judges in another case". 192 
Fourth, the office of the President of the Tribunal is a significant institutional feature of 
the modem ad hoc tribunals. In addition to presiding over both the ICTY and ICTR 
Appeals Chamber, the role of the President has developed substantially to encompass 
judicial, administrative, diplomatie and even political functions. The President has 
190 Ibid., at 881. 
191 ICTY Statute, supra note 47, arts. 13bis(1)(c), 13ter(1)(c); see also Kittichaisaree, supra note Il at 23. 
192 May & Wierda, 1999, supra note 18 at 747 citing Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskié, Case No. IT-95-14, 
Trial Chamber, Decision, 21 January 1998. 
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facilitated the rule-making function of the judges of the modem ad hoc tribunals in the 
process of improving the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 193 
Finally, and perhaps most significant from the perspective of the ICC's institutional 
structure, the modem ad hoc tribunals did not have any external quasi-Iegislative body to 
enact, approve or amend their respective Rules of Procedure and Evidence, nor to change 
the substantive law they declared, as the case may be. Judge Hunt in Aleksovski 
recognized the implications of institutional constraints at the international level in 
developing and refining international criminal law, stating: "unlike in domestic systems, 
there is no legislative body readily able to fine-tune its Statute when a decision of the 
Appeals Chamber is subsequently seen to have produced an injustice. It is quite 
unrealistic to expect the Security Council of the United Nations to perform that task.,,194 
Similarly, in Erdemovié, Judge Cassese addressed the significance of institutional 
differences between national and international criminal courts: 
The philosophy behind aU national criminal proceedings, whether they take a common-
law or a civil-Iaw approach, is unique to those proceedings and stems from the fact that 
national courts operate in a context where the three fundamental functions (law-making, 
adjudication and law enforcement) are discharged by central organs partaking of the 
State's direct authority over individuals. That logic cannot be simply transposed onto the 
international level: there, a different logic imposed by the different position and role of 
courts must perforee inspire and govern international criminal proceedings. 195 
The role of the Assembly of States Parties in relation to the ICC adds an interesting reply 
to these statements by Judge Hunt and Judge Cassese, which will be discussed in Chapter 
3. 
193 Jon Cina and David Tolbert, "The Office of the President: A Third Voice" in May, supra note 108 at 86-
90. 
194 Aleksovski, Judge Hunt, supra note 89, para. 5. 
195 Erdemovié, Judge Cassese, supra note 111, para. 5. 
72 
Development of the International Criminal Law Tradition 
Conclusion 
While the creation of the modem ad hoc tribunals makes it possible to conceive of an 
emergent international criminal law tradition, the foregoing analysis shows that their 
attempts to theoretically define sources of law and interpretive principles solely by 
reference to public international law has been insufficient. In practice, gaps which have 
emerged in the de facto definition of applicable law taken from Article 38 of the leJ 
Statute have been filled by resort to judicial discretion which draws upon persuasive, non-
binding precedent from transnational common laws. In sorne cases, the persuasive 
rationale is unstated by these judges, or weak attempts are made to justify their decisions 
as fully consistent with general principles of public international law. However, notable 
instances in the jurisprudence have been presented which demonstrate that the 
fundarnental debate in the international criminal law tradition between enhancing 
hurnanitarian protection versus ensuring fairness to the accused has been the turning point 
in difficult cases. In rare instances, there have been attempts to reconcile these competing 
aims which have been at the core of the international criminallaw tradition since its birth. 
As these decisions have accurnulated over time at the modem ad hoc tribunals, a basic 
system of precedence has been adopted to attempt to achieve an agenda of reconciling 
these aims. 
Why then has the recent trend in international criminal law since the modem ad hoc 
tribunals been to attempt to codify the sources of applicable law, alter the way in which 
73 
Development of the International Criminal Law Tradition 
this body of law should evolve, and revise the type of precedence which should apply?196 
In particular, how does Article 21 of the Rome Statute, and the institutional structure of 
the ICC, differ from the approach that has prevailed at the modem ad hoc tribunals? 
Does it purport to fill gaps in international criminallaw, and, if so, how effective is it in 
doing so? How does it affect the fundamental tensions in the international criminallaw 
tradition between enhancing humanitarian protection versus ensuring fairness to the 
accused? How could the notion of transnational common laws operate in the ICC 
consistent with, or in spite of, Article 21 of the Rome Statute? What is the nature of past 
decisions of the ICC in this new system? These are the fundamental questions ln 
sustaining the international criminallaw tradition to which Chapter 3 is directed. 
196 See, e.g., ICC Statute, supra note 37, art. 21; United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, 
Regulation No. 2000/15, On the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal 
Offences, UNTAETIREG/2000/15, 6 June 2000, s. 3, online: United Nations 
<http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetRlRegOOI5E.pdf>; Special Court for Sierra Leone, Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, adopted on 16 January 2002, as amended to 14 May 2005, r. 72bis, online: SCSL 
<http://www.sc-sl.org/rulesofprocedureandevidence.pdf>; Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone in 
Report the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N. SCOR, 55th 
Sess., U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (2000), arts. 14, 19(1), 20(3), online: SCSL <http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-
statute.html>; Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, 10 December 2003, art. 17, online: Coalition 
Provisional Authority <http://www.cpa-iraq.orglhumanJights/Statute.htm> . 
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Sustaining the International Criminal Law Tradition: ICC 
The project of creating a permanent international criminal court has a long history, but 
only really gained traction around the same time that the first modem ad hoc was being 
established. Owing to the fact that the negotiation process of drafting a statute for the 
ICC took place alongside the developments discussed in Chapter 2, the modem ad hoc 
tribunals continued to promulgate important jurisprudence weIl after the Rome Statute 
was finalized. The thinking that went into the ICC, therefore, represents an effort to build 
on the early lessons from these tribunal s, as well as an independent exercise in redefining 
the international criminal law tradition - without the benefit of the full experience of the 
modem ad hoc tribunals. There are many important differences between the Rome 
Statute and the substantive, procedural and evidentiary law developed by the modem ad 
hoc tribunals, but the most germane for the purposes of this thesis is Article 21, which for 
the first time in history seeks to elucidate sources of international criminal law. 197 This 
provision states: 
1. The Court shaH apply: 
Article 21 
Applicable law 
(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence; 
(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles 
and mIes of international law, including the established principles of the 
internationallaw of armed conflict; 
197 Margaret McAuliffe de Guzman, "Article 21: Applicable Law" in Otto Triffterer, ed., Commentary on 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Baden-Baden: Nomos VerlagsgeseHschaft, 1999), 
435 at 438. 
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(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national 
laws of legal systems of the world including, as appropriate, the nationallaws of 
States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that 
those princip les are not inconsistent with this Statute and with international law 
and internationally recognized norms and standards. 
2. The Court may apply princip les and rules of law as interpreted in its previous 
decisions. 
3. The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent 
with internationally recognized human rights, and be without any adverse distinction 
founded on grounds such as gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3/98 age, race, 
colour, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social 
origin, wealth, birth or other status. 199 
Article 21 of the Rome Statute is worded in a very cumbersome manner. It can only be 
understood in the context in which it was drafted: by round after round of negotiation and 
compromise. It raises the most theoretical as well as the most practical challenges to the 
viability of the international criminal law tradition. The justification for the provision is 
both to provide a normative super-structure to the tradition, as well as fill gaps in the law 
to be applied. However, as will be seen, it may fail to meet either of these objectives and 
risks undermining the entire project of the ICC. 
While the Rome Statute formally restricts the law-making authority of international 
judges with respect to procedural and evidentiary law in many ways, there is ample room 
in Article 21 to determine the law. The fundamental tensions in the international criminal 
law tradition between extending humanitarian protection and ensuring fairness to the 
accused have been aggravated, both in terms of specifie rules as well as institutional 
arrangements. The operation of Article 21 confirms the hypothesis that Glenn's theory of 
198 Article 7(3) of the Rome Statute relates to crimes against humanity and states: "For the purpose of this 
Statute, it is understood that the term 'gender' refers to the two sexes, male and female, within the context 
of society. The term 'gender' does not indicate any meaning different from the above.": ICC Statute, supra 
note 37, art. 7(3) . 
199 Ibid., art. 21. 
76 
Sustaining the International Criminal Law Tradition 
transnational common laws has a strong explanatory value for what is going on in the 
application of law. Finally, the long-term viability of the ICC remains an open question 
on the terms of Article 21 (2), and two competing visions will be presented of the future of 
the international criminal law tradition in this regard. The possibility of a coherent 
jurisprudence developing in light of these significant obstacles is by no means certain. 
Aims of the Applicable Law Provision 
Why was a de jure provision on 'applicable law' required in light of the de facto 
applicable law provisions applied by the modem ad hoc tribunals and historical tribunals? 
Without debating the content of such a provision, its mere existence is the first juncture 
for analysis. Article 21 of the Rome Statute has been called "a tissue of imperfectly 
defined sources",200 and its adoption has been justified on several grounds - which may 
be se en as recurring themes in the development of international criminal law, based on 
the foregoing chapters. 
First, given the hybrid nature and newness of this tradition, an applicable law provision 
was thought necessary to resolve challenges of "normative indeterminacy inherent in the 
development of internationallegal norms.,,201 The promise of Article 21 in this regard is 
to provide a normative framework or structure for the entire legal world overseen by the 
ICC. Second, most commentators agree that Article 21 was designed to serve a 'gap-
filling' function to fill lacunae where substantive, procedural or evidentiary rules are 
200 Alain Pellet, "Applicable Law" in Antonio Cassese et al., eds., The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: A Commentary, Vol. II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 1051 at 1053. 
201 de Guzman, supra note 197 at439. 
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apparently lacking.202 An important distinction is made with respect to gap-filling in 
national law and in the international criminal law tradition. It has been recognized that 
national law is "anchored in a fine network of legal norms [i.e. a legal tradition] that lay 
down rules that are intricately interwoven with the codes.,,203 The problem is that 
international criminal law has no norms to anchor itself to. It has no longstanding 
tradition, only a tentative and uncertain existence with little theoretical basis. Without an 
established tradition behind it, international criminallaw is a law seeking out a tradition -
hence the paradox ofit being an 'emerging' legal tradition. Ironically, this predicament is 
both the root of the problem that Article 21 of the Rome Statute seeks to address, as weIl 
as the reason why Article 21 is unlikely to succeed in patching together a legal tradition. 
As the analysis in the preceding chapter demonstrates, however, resort to transnational 
common law has been the way that the modem ad hoc tribunals have generally filled the 
most difficult gaps in their statutes, as well as by deciding between tensions of extending 
humanitarian protection versus fairness to the accused. The extent to which Article 21 
constrains or condones this approach warrants attention. Before delving into this 
analysis, however, it is necessary to situate this provision within the broader 
developments in the international criminallaw tradition to understand its implications. 
Separation from Tradition of Public International Law 
202 J. Verhoeven, "Article 21 of the Rome Statute and the Ambiguities of Applicable Law" (2002) 33 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 3 at 17; de Guzman, supra note 197 at 443; Kittichaisaree, 
supra note Il at 52. 
203 Pellet, supra note 200 at 1067. 
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Article 21 of the Rome Statute represents a split, at least in part, from the dominance of 
general public international law in international criminal law. This single source that 
could have grounded an international criminallaw tradition, and indeed the source relied 
upon by the earlier international criminal tribunals, has been fatally undermined. This is 
not to deny the strong and ongoing role of public internationallaw, but merely to identify 
that its exclusivity over international criminal law is denied in the Rome Statute and, 
therefore, for the definition of this tradition moving forward. This view is not without its 
detractors. 
To begin with, Margaret McAuliffe de Guzman has noted that while the applicable law 
provision in the Rome Statute is generally inspired from Article 38 of the ICI Statute, 
Article 21 "modifies the approach taken in the IC] Statute to fit the context of 
international criminallaw.,,204 By the time of the Rome Conference, it was clear that 
international criminal tribunals were applying Article 38 of the IC] Statute as a matter of 
practice. Therefore, Article 21 of the Rome Statute must be viewed as a deliberate 
attempt to modify this approach. There are important differences between these 
provisions which go to the heart of the international criminal law tradition. First, while 
Article 38 of the IC] Statute places each of its sources of law on equal footing (with the 
exception of 'subsidiary' sources such as judicial decisions and teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists), Article 21 of the Rome Statute establishes a hierarchy or 
pyramid of sources. Secondly, there is no explicit mention of international custom in 
Article 21 of the Rome Statute as there is in Article 38 of the IC] Statute - the former 
204 de Guzman, supra note 197 at 436. 
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referring to 'principles and rules of internationallaw' .205 Third, Article 21 (3) of the Rome 
Statute entrenches internationally recognized human rights as infusing the 'application 
and interpretation' of every source of law, whereas no such provision appears in Article 
38 of the ICl Statute. Fourth, Article 21(1)(c) of the Rome Statute represents a 
significant evolution of the concept of 'general principles of law', which has been lauded 
because it "brings useful precision to the definition of general principles of law". 206 Alan 
Nissel argues that "this was the most controversial source codified and distinguishes 
Article 21 of the Rome Statute from Article 38 of the statute establishing the International 
Court of lustice.,,207 Finally, the nature of prior decisions of the court is defined 
differently in Article 59 of the ICl Statute compared to Article 21(2) of the Rome Statute. 
This issue of precedence will be considered in detaillater. 
Despite these significant differences between Article 21 of the Rome Statute and the 
general public international law sources, sorne prominent commentators continue to deny 
any break has been made with the traditional sources of public international law, as 
articulated in Article 38 of the ICl. These scholars still hold to the view, in the face ofthe 
plain wording of Article 21 and the record of the negotiations surrounding it, that public 
international law continues to reign within the institutions created by the Rome Statute. 
ln other words, they deny that it will be applying a law sui generis. Cherif Bassiouni 
argues that Article 10 of the Rome Statute "requires the application of international law 
205 "While it is clear that custom is included in Article 21 [(1)(b)], it appears that the reason why 'custom' 
was not explicitly mentioned was because the concept of gradually evolving custom was considered too 
imprecise for the purposes of international criminallaw": Alan Nissel, "Continuing Crimes in the Rome 
Statute" (2004) 25 Michigan Journal ofInternational Law 653, n. 142 (Lexis). 
206 Pellet, supra note 197 at 1082. 
207 Nissel, supra note 205, n. 19. 
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whose four sources are listed in Article 38 of the Statue of the International Court of 
Justice".208 Article 10 of the Rome Statute provides: "Nothing in this Part shall be 
interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of 
internationallaw for pur poses other than this Statute.,,209 
Bassiouni' s argument is quite weak and his denial that the international criminal law 
world changed after Article 21 is not convincing. It may be easily dispatched by focusing 
on the explicit wording in Article 10 of the Rome Statute which states 'for purposes other 
than this Statute'. Therefore, for the purposes of the Statute, Article 21 would be wholly 
and completely applicable. It would be impossible for the judges to deny it. 
Additionally, the ICC, as a creature of the Rome Statute, is governed by this treaty as its 
constitutional document. Despite the customary nature in internationallaw of the sources 
articulated in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, the ICC is bound first to consider the 
provisions of its own statute which has been crafted for the specifie purposes to which the 
ICC is directed. It is entirely indefensible to argue that an international court should 
disregard a provision in its own statute in favor of an analogous, but different, provision 
in another international court's statute. Such an approach is dictated by Articles 31 and 
32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties, which properly and squarely applies 
to the interpretation to be given to the Rome Statute itself. ·Interestingly, Bassiouni agrees 
that the ICC must apply these interpretive canons, making his argument circular?10 
Therefore, Article 21 of the Rome Statute represents a split from strict adherence to 
208 Bassiouni, 2003, supra note 34 at 501. 
209 ICC Statute, supra note 37, art. 10 [emphasis added]. 
210 Ibid. 
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Article 38 of the lCl Statute and in so doing, divorces international criminallaw from the 
possibility of claiming public international law with its thousands of years of history and 
tradition as being the exclusive anchor for the law applied by the lCC in concrete cases. 
Restraint in Judicial Law-Making & lnstitutional Change 
Another important aspect of the international criminal law tradition which has been 
seriously challenged in the Rome Statute is the role of international judges as powerful 
agents for law-making. One of the leading commentaries on the Rome Statute de scribes 
the fundamental debate on the role of judges at the lCC, and how Article 21 came to 
become a battleground on the issue: 
Two princip le schools of thought emerged at the Preparatory Committee meetings 
regarding the appropriate degree of judicial discretion in disceming applicable law. A 
minority of States took the position that the princip le of legality requires the virtual 
elimination of judicial discretion in the criminallaw context. Any doubt as to the relevant 
legal provision should be resolved, according to this view, by direct application of the 
appropriate domestic law. The majority position, on the other hand, sought to 
accommodate the unique nature of the international legal order by allowing the judges to 
discern and apply general principles of international criminallaw. Article 21 represents a 
compromise between these two schools ofthought.211 
There is no agreement, however, in the literature on whether the Rome Statute as a whole 
has effectively altered the sc ope of authority of international judges to 'make law'. While 
sorne argue "Article 21, therefore, accords a great deal of discretion to the judges at the 
lCC",212 others daim "they [the drafters] have shown a mistrust for the judge [sic] that is 
reflected in a large number of other provisions of the Statute.,,213 While the judges of the 
post-WWII and modem ad hoc tribunals were entrusted with adopting and amending their 
211 de Guzman, supra note 197 at 436. 
212 Ibid., at 439. 
213 Pellet, supra note 200 at 1056. 
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Rules of Procedure and Evidence, this power is largely denied to the judges of the ICC. 
Pursuant to Article 51 of the Rome Statute, the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
(Rules) "shaH enter into force upon adoption by a two-thirds majority of the members of 
the Assembly of States Parties.,,214 The amending procedure for these Rules is onerous 
and could prove problematic, requiring the same level of approval by the Assembly of 
States Parties? 15 Article 51(3) provides an exceptional procedure for provisional 
amendments of these rules by the judges: "in urgent cases where the Rules do not provide 
for a specifie situation before the Court, the judges may, by a two-thirds majority, draw 
up provisional Rules to be applied until adopted, amended or rejected at the next ordinary 
or special session of the Assembly of States Parties".216 For its part, Rule 63(5) of the 
ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence prohibits any direct application of national laws, 
reinforcing the authority of Article 21 in a redundant manner: "[t]he Chambers shaH not 
apply nationallaws goveming evidence, other than in accordance with article 21. ,,217 
One commentator has already raised the dilemma of "what happens if the next session of 
the Assembly of States Parties rejects a provisional rule adopted in such 
circumstances?,,218 If decisions under the provisional rule were void, the judicial 
independence of the ICC could be threatened. If they were not, the accused could claim 
unfaimess in application of the rules. The unacceptability of this compromise willlikely 
214 ICC Statute, supra note 37, art. 51(1). 
215 Ibid., art. 51(2). 
216 Ibid., art. 51(3). 
217 Ru/es of Procedure and Evidence, Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, lst Sess., New York, 3-10 September 2002, ICC-ASP/1/3 - 10, r. 63(5), online: ICC 
<http://www .icc-cpLintilibrary/aboutiofficialjournal/basicdocuments/asp Jecords( e ).pdt> [ICC Rules]. 
218 Pellet, supra note 200 at 1065. 
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lay dormant until it arises in a concrete case. It is a significant risk that would be 
irresponsible for the ICC to ignore. An even more serious problem relates to the fact that 
the Rome Statute itself contains "provisions of a procedural nature [that] could have been 
included in the Rules,,?19 If problems relating to those procedural rules arise during the 
course of a proceeding, the judges of the ICC would not have recourse to the ability to 
provisionally amend the rule, since it would be a statutory provision beyond their reach. 
The likelihood of these problems materializing should not be ignored, given that the 
judges of the modem ad hoc tribunals had to frequently amend their Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence to respond to challenges that arose in concrete cases. 
A less serious limitation on the law-making abilities of the ICC judges is existence of the 
Elements of Crimes which are also adopted by two-thirds of the Assembly of States 
Parties. Article 9 of the Rome Statute provides that the Elements of Crimes "shall assist 
the Court in the interpretation and application of article 6, 7 and 8 [genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes].,,220 The combination of the obligatory term 'shall' 
with the permissive term 'assist' is strange. Again, the reason for this lies in the nature of 
the Rome Statute as a negotiated treaty: "[ s ]ome delegates, led by the US, wanted the 
Elements of Crimes to bind the ICC judges so as to ensure certainty and clarity of the law 
of the ICC Statute. Other delegations opposed restriction on the ICC judges in their 
interpretation of international criminal law.,,221 The International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) commentary on the Elements of Crimes insists they "are to be used as an 
219 Ibid, at 1063. 
220 See ICC Statute, supra note 37, art. 9 [emphasis added]. 
221 Kittichaisaree, supra note Il at 51. 
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interpretative aid and are not binding upon the judges. The elements must 'be consistent 
with this Statute' and it should be emphasized that consistency with the Statute must be 
determined by the Court. ,,222 
Notwithstanding the apparent limitations on their law-making powers, it has been 
postulated "that the judges will interpret the text [of Article 21], at least partially, so as to 
recover the powers inherent in all courts, of which the drafters of the Statute clearly 
wanted to deprive them.,,223 While this may be true of substantive law given the non-
binding nature of the Elements of Crimes and their cursory nature, within the realm of 
procedural and evidentiary law, the foregoing analysis demonstrates that there has been a 
genuine shift against judicial discretion. 
Deepening Cleavages Between Humanitarian Protection & Fairness to Accused 
Rather than attempting to reconcile the tension inherent in the international criminal hlw 
tradition between extending humanitarian protection versus ensuring fairness to the 
accused, the Rome Statute has only deepened these cleavages. The implications of this 
entrenchment of competing ideals within the law and institutions of the ICC are severe 
since they go to the very foundations of international cri minaI law. It is not difficult to 
envisage a show-down at the ICC of the type that took place at the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber in Erdemovié. Indeed, the tone of the literature in this regard is particularly 
222 Knut Dormann et al., Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court: Sources and Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) at 8 [emphasis added]. 
223 Pellet, supra note 200 at 1053. 
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bitter as the tensions between criminal lawyers and human rights activists are laid bare. 
There are both substantive and institutional aspects of this phenomenon. 
Extending humanitarian protection inevitably occurred in the Rome Statute, given that 
numerous humanitarian organizations were involved in negotiations. The Rome Statute is 
not merely a codification of existing law. For example, the ICTY Trial Chamber in 
Kupreskié found that Article 7(1 )(h) of the Rome Statute on persecution as a crime 
against humanity "is not consonant with customary international law",224 and therefore 
refused to follow it. 
Enhancing fairness to the accused is also embedded in the Rome Statute, similarly 
flowing from the efforts of human rights and criminal law advocates during the 
negotiations. It has been argued that there are many examples of the '''victory' of the 
criminal law approach over the internationalist vision,,?25 In particular, it has been 
asserted that "the word 'custom' was excluded [in Article 21], [ ... ] due to the fact that the 
criminallawyers, whose influence increased during the drafting of the Statute, opposed it 
in the name of an erroneous conception of the principle of the legality of offences and 
punishment.,,226 The need for clarity in provisions holding individuals criminally 
responsible is repeatedly stressed in the commentary on Article 21.227 
224 Kupreskié, Trial Judgement, supra note 173, para. 580. 
225 Pellet, supra note 200 at 1064, 1058. 
226 Ibid., at 1071; Pellet's language is strong and borders on visceral as he earlier stated at 1057: "The result 
ofa veritable brainwashing operation led by criminallawyers, with the self-interested support of the United 
States, this argument is unacceptable." 
227 See Verhoeven, supra note 202 at 10. 
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International human rights law, which operated as a powerful normative vehicle at the ad 
hoc tribunals has become formally entrenched in the applicable law of the ICC, and 
infuses other sources. While no one would disagree that international human rights 
norms must inform international trials, Article 21 has taken the unprecedented step of 
raising all such norms to the levels of a quasi-constitutional status in a manner that can 
allow the judges of the ICC to effectively rewrite international criminal law with the 
stroke of a pen. Article 21 (3) of the Rome Statute "mandates that the interpretation of the 
Statute should 'be consistent with internationally recognized human rights'. Though this 
phrase obviously refers to the rights of the accused, it can also be read to include the 
rights of the victims, which opens the do or to a more aggressive mode ofprosecution.,,228 
Under this view, with respect to the accused, the 'application and interpretation' of the 
sources of law in Article 21 (1) must be consistent with human rights, such that 
"procedural mIes must be constmed so as to not infringe the right to a fair trial"?29 More 
controversially, Article 21(3) may have the effect of "authorizing the Court to hold such a 
norm [that is in violation of internationally recognized human rights] to be 'ultra vires' 
and thus inapplicable.,,23o Notably, Article 21(3) does not simply refer to jus cogens 
norms, or even "fundamental human rights, traditionally quoted as examples of 
preemptory mIes, but to all internationally recognized human rights.,,231 
228 George P. Fletcher and Jens David Ohlin, "Reclaiming Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law in the 
Darfur Case" (2005) 3 Journal oflnternational Criminal Justice 539 at 552 (Westlaw). 
229 Verhoeven, supra note 202 at 14. 
230 Pellet, supra note 200 at 1081; see also George E. Edwards, "International Human Rights Law 
Challenges to the New International Criminal Court: The Search and Seizure Right to Privacy" (2001) 26 
Yale Journal oflnternational Law 323 (Lexis); see contra Verhoeven, supra note 202 at 14-5. 
231 Pellet, supra note 200 at 1081. 
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With respect to humanitarian protection, there are several provisions in the ICC Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence that have already relied on Article 21(3) of the Statute to extend 
humanitarian protection based on internationally recognized human rights. Allowances 
are made for the testimony of victims of sexual violence in Rule 72 of the ICC Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, based in part on the need to comply with internationally 
recognized human rights?32 Likewise, Rule 145(2)(b )(v) of the ICC Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence identifies as an aggravating circumstance in sentencing: the "[ c ]ommission 
of the crime for any motive involving discrimination on any of the grounds referred to in 
article 21, paragraph 3".233 
From an institutional perspective, a formaI division has been created in the Rome Statute 
between judges with criminal law backgrounds and those with international law 
backgrounds. There will be no unified bench at the ICC. The appointment of judges at 
the ICC departs from the practice of the modem ad hoc tribunals which merely required 
sufficient geographical distribution as the dominant eriteria, by replacing it with subject-
matter expertise as the main determinate of judicial appointments.234 Article 36 of the 
Rome Statute requires that every candidate for election as a judge be either an expert in 
criminallaw and procedure or in internationallaw, such as international humanitarian law 
or human rights?35 If this were not blatant enough, the candidates for judicial office are 
segregated into these two camps, appearing on separate 'lists' from which a proportion of 
232 See ICC Rules, supra note 217, art. 72(2). 
233 Ibid., r. 145(2)(b)(v). 
234 Geographical distribution, representation of the principal legal systems of the world, and a gender 
balance are other considerations in the selection of ICC judges: see ibid., art. 36(8). 
235 ICC Statute, supra note 37, art. 36(3)(b). A candidate for judicial office may qualify to appear on both 
lists: ibid., art. 36(5). 
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nine criminal law-qualified judges is selected for every five international law-qualified 
judges.236 The brand of being a 'criminal law judge' or an 'international law judge' 
remains even after their election. Article 39 of the Rome Statute on the composition of 
Chambers states: 
[ ... ] The assignment ofjudges to divisions shaH be based on the nature of the functions to 
be performed by each division and the qualifications and experience of the judges elected 
to the Court, in such a way that each division shaH contain an appropriate combination of 
expertise in criminallaw and procedure and in international law. The Trial and Pre-Trial 
Divisions shaH be composed predominantly of judges with criminal trial experience.237 
The practical justification for this rule may be valid, but it has the very negative side-
effect of formally entrenching and, perhaps, exacerbating a fundamental conflict of vision 
behind the international criminal law tradition - pitting two groups within it against one 
another. While neither body of judges can be taken to be monolithic in their views, there 
is a risk of that the ICC will over time develop a highly polarized bench of the type that 
took place in the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Erdemovié. This would be a regressive step 
in the development of international criminal law that would cast doubt on its legitimacy 
as law. One solution is to favour judicial candidates who are qualified as experts in 
'international criminal law' over time, rather than 'criminal law', or 'international law', 
such that they qualify for both lists. Over time, such candidates will grow in number. 
Ongoing Role of Transnational Common Laws 
Recalling that one of the aims of Article 21 of the Rome Statute is to fill gaps in the law, 
and given that Glenn's theory of transnational common laws operates to fill gaps where 
236 Ibid., art. 36(5). 
237 Ibid., art. 39. 
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there are no particular rules applicable,238 the question that must be answered is whether 
Article 21 opens the door to resort to such transnational common laws. At least from a 
theoretical perspective, an affirmative answer may be reasonably given to this question. 
More troubling, however, is that the final element of Glenn's theory is given a home in 
Article 21, namely, that different law may apply to different accused. In the context of 
criminal proceedings this is a challenge to the rule of law. 
Given that Article 21 is a hierarchical delineation of sources of law, the final source of 
last resort is where we must look for transnational common laws to operate. Article 
21(1)(c) provides as a last resort that the ICC shall apply "[ ... ] general principles of law 
derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems of the world including, as 
appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the 
crime, provided that those principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and with 
international law and internationally recognized norms and standards.,,239 Despite 
complaints of complexity in this articulation, there is an emerging consensus in the 
literature that this provision conf ers "a wide discretionary power,,240 on the judges, "will 
provide ample opportunities for judicial creativity",241 "allows the ICC to resort to 
drawing inspiration from case law in the criminal field decided by national courts of the 
various legal systems of the world",242 and leaves it to judicial discretion to determine 
238 See discussion in Chapter 2 based on Glenn, On Common Laws, supra note 98 at 62, 45. 
239 ICC Statute, supra note 37, art. 21(1)(c). 
240 Pellet, supra note 200 at 1075. 
241 Gennady M. Danilenko, "The Statute of the International Criminal Court and Third States" (2000) 21 
Michigan Journal of International Law 445 at 490 (Lexis). 
242 Kittichaisaree, supra note Il at 52. 
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which legal systems they will consider243 with the most likely candidates being "reduced 
to a small number in the contemporary world: the family of civil-Iaw countries, the 
common law, and, perhaps, Islamic law.,,244 These views aggregate to make a powerful 
case that the basic characteristics of transnational common laws exist in Article 21 (1)( c ) 
of the Rome Statute: that they are non-binding but persuasive laws, that may fill gaps 
where particular law is silent, and depend on collaboration among judges. 
This leaves the most controversial aspect of Glenn's theory of transnational common laws 
to be considered: namely, that it contemplates the possibility of different law applying to 
different people. As noted in Chapter 2, this characteristic has not been clearly operating 
in this tradition in the pasto However, Article 21(1)(c) of the Rome Statute may have 
brought it home, by allowing resort to "the national laws of States that would normally 
exercise jurisdiction over the crime".245 The drafting history ofthis provision sheds sorne 
light on what is meant by the States that would 'normally exercise jurisdiction'. An 
earlier proposaI identified these as "first to the national law of the State where the crime 
was committed, second to the laws of the State of nationality of the accuse d, and third to 
the laws of the custodial State.,,246 Given that this specific proposaI was considered, but 
not adopted, it could also reasonably be held that based on passive personality jurisdiction 
under intemationallaw, the nationallaws of the victim's State could also be consulted in 
243 de Guzman, supra note 197 at 444. 
244 Pellet, supra note 200 at 1073-4 [emphasis added]; one is indeed hard pressed to frnd references to 
Islamic law, or other non-Western traditions, in the jurisprudence of the modem ad hoc tribunals. 
245 ICC Statute, supra note 37, art. 21 (l)( c). 
246 de Guzman, supra note 197 at 444. 
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the case of an international armed conflict, systematic attack, or genocide?47 It is not 
possible to interpret Article 21 (1)( c) of the Rome Statute to authorize applying the 
particular law of on1y one of the se States, since it refers in the plural to that 'nationallaws 
of States'. Therefore, Article 21(1)(c) would operate to fill gaps first by considering legal 
systems (or traditions) of the world seeking broad consensus. If it did not find such 
agreement, as in Erdemovié, then it would examine the smaller subset of nationallaws 
that would ordinarily apply on the facts of the particular case. While there could be 
multiple national laws applicable, in cases of non-international armed conflicts, it is 
conceivable that only one State would normally have jurisdiction. 
For example, in the Uganda situation presently before the ICC, where a perpetrator is a 
f 
member of the Lord' s Resistance Army and a U gandan national, the conflict is in 
northern Uganda, the victim is a Ugandan child soldier, and if the accused is apprehended 
and held in custody in Uganda before transfer to the ICC, then only Uganda would 
'normally exercise jurisdiction' - only Ugandan law would be applicable as a last resort. 
In the end, however, it could be rendered inapplicable if it is "inconsistent with this 
Statute and with internationallaw and internationally recognized norms and standards.,,248 
For example, a mIe of Ugandan law which violates international norms would be 
inapplicable. This would be the ultimate situation of non-liquet. There would, 
theoretically, be no answer. If, however, the Ugandan law met this requirement, it would 
be applied by the ICC. In a case dealing with another non-international armed conflict, 
247 Universal jurisdiction is not relevant here since it simply bring us back to the earlier broad analysis of 
legal systems of many States. 
248 ICC Statute, supra note 37, art. 21(1)(c). 
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that law could be applicable. We are thus faced with the possibility of different law 
applying to different accused. 
For scholars that have seriously considered this provision's implications (and there are 
not many), there has been an allergie reaction to this possibility but they have fallen short 
of recognizing that Article 21 has the potential to undermine the rule of law?49 Margaret 
McAuliffe de Guzman, for example, notes that this "particularized approach would 
undermine the consistent application of the law to different accused.,,250 Jose Alvarez 
also argues against the possibility of specifie national law being ultimately of last resort, 
but provides no basis for his argument: "It appears that what is contemplated is the 
comparative use of local law - that is, that judges look to the body of locallaws in general 
in order to infer commonly accepted principles among a variety of legal systems. The use 
of, for example, pre-existing Rwandan law as to the definition of 'complicity,' if the acts 
are committed by a Rwandan national within Rwanda, is not apparently authorized.,,251 
Even if we assume that Alvarez is correct in assuming that complicity could not be 
defined based on the other sources of law in Article 21, he fails to identify which States, 
other than Rwanda, would ordinarily exercise jurisdiction in his examples - thus bringing 
249 Before considering these reactions, it is notable that at least one State has issued a reservation to the 
Rome Statute which expressly caUs on the ICC to apply its national law when sentencing its nationals for 
any crimes of which they are convicted. 
See "Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Declaration and Reservations", online: United 
Nations <http://untreaty . un.orglEN G LISHlbib lei englishinternetbib le/partI! chapter XVIII/treaty 1 O. asp>: 
"Honduras - 13 July 2004[".] the Republic of Honduras declares its willingness to accept persons 
sentenced by the Court, provided that such persons are of Honduran nationality, the Court has decided their 
cases pursuant to article 21, paragraph 1 (c), and the terms of their sentences are equal to or less than the 
maximum terms permitted by Honduran law for committing the crimes ofwhich they have been convicted." 
250 de Guzman, supra note 197 at 444. 
251 Jose E. Alvarez, "Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda" (1999) 24 Yale Journal of 
International Law 365 at n. 561 (Lexis). 
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their national laws into the analysis. It appears that his argument is not grounded in 
Article 21, but on a reaction to its probable outcome. Again, there is a denial in the 
literature surrounding Article 21 to recognize it for what it is. This brings us to the final 
major implication of Article 21 for the international criminallaw tradition. 
Nature of Prior Decisions of the ICC Indeterminate 
A decision will need to be made by the ICC as to whether it will tolerate different law 
applying to different accused, or if after it makes the very first 'particularized' decision 
based on the subset of nationallaws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction, it 
will opt instead to follow that decision in future cases as enabled under Article 21 (2). 
The wording of this provision on the nature of prior decisions of the ICC is otherwise 
quite uninteresting, at least on first blush:252 
The Court may apply princip les and mIes of law as interpreted in its previous decisions.253 
It has been recognized that this is a "discretionary use of precedent [ ... that] represents a 
compromise between the common law approach to judicial decisions as binding 
precedent, and the traditional civil law view that judicial pronouncements in specifie 
cases bind only the parties to the court.,,254 Sorne commentators have predicted that the 
252 "Obviously, it would be sheer nonsense to affirm that the Court is forbidden to apply princip les and mIes 
as interpreted in its previous decisions": Verhoeven, supra note 202 at 13. 
253 ICC Statute, supra note 37, art. 21(2). With respect to treatment of the decisions ofthe modern ad hoc 
tribunal s, they "are not binding on the recently established International Criminal Court (ICC), but 
interpretations of their governing mIes and statutes will be persuasive authority due to their similarities with 
those of the ICC": Kelly Buchanan, "Freedom of Expression and International Criminal Law: An Analysis 
of the Decision to Create a Testimonial Privilege for Journalists" (2004) 35 Victoria University of 
Wellington Law Review 609 at 651 (Lexis); see also Lucy Martinez, "Prosecuting Terrorists at the 
International Criminal Court: Possibilities and Problems" (2002) 34 Rutgers Law Journal 1 at 17 (Lexis); 
see a1so Phyllis Hwang, "Defining Crimes Against Humanity in the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court" (1998) 22 Fordham International Law Journal 457 at 503 (Westlaw). 
254 de Guzman, supra note 197 at 445. 
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ICC will simply adopt the same approach as the modern ad hoc tribunals, discussed in 
Chapter 2, to the treatment oftheir past decisions.255 
It is possible that Article 21 (2) of the Rome Statute carries more significant implications 
for the international criminal law tradition than has been envisaged so far. The first 
possibility, which is the approach of the modern ad hoc tribunals is to build a body of 
jurisprudence over time that initially draws heavily on sources external to the tribunal s, 
but increasingly relies over time on the tribunal's own jurisprudence, looking outside 
their walls only to filliacunae. This is also inherent in the tailored doctrine of precedence 
developed by the modern ad hoc tribunals, discussed in Chapter 2, such that an 
international criminal court "should follow its previous decisions, but should be free to 
depart from them for cogent reasons in the interests of justice.,,256 This standard is far 
more stringent than that appearing in Article 21 (2) of the Rome Statute, which is 
completely permissive in apparently allowing the judges to disregard or apply their prior 
decisions at will. It would be open to the judges at the ICC to follow the lead of the 
modern ad hoc tribunals. Indeed, many expect that "the ICC will facilitate the uniform 
and consistent application of international criminal law. By rendering judgments in 
concrete cases and developing a consistent jurisprudence, the ICC may clarify and even 
develop international criminal law.,,257 In this way, Article 21(2) of the Rome Statute 
would increasingly operate over time, as the ICC begins to decide issues in concrete 
cases, to resolve legal issues without resort to the other sources of law in Article 21 (1 )(b)-
255 Kittichaisaree, supra note Il at 52. 
256 Ibid, para. 107. 
257 Danilenko, supra note 241 at 490. 
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(c). This would suggest a phased development of the ICC' s jurisprudence, and a graduaI 
closing of the porous borders of international criminallaw to other legal traditions. 
The second possibility would be for the ICC to rely on Article 21 (2) of the Rome Statute, 
likely in conjunction with Article 21(3), to proactively improve and develop international 
criminallaw with only a 100 se concept of precedence. Any prior decision with which the 
judges simply did not agree based on prevailing human rights principles could be 
disregarded. A dynamic normative order would be created, constantly adapting to new 
situations and conflicts. This possibility would be fully justified based on the wording of 
Article 21. 
In either of these models, the ICC has the potential through the operation of Article 21 (2) 
to bring into existence "a new legal order of internationallaw,,258 - invoking the language 
used by the European Court of Justice to de scribe its sui generis character. 
Conclusion 
It has been recognized that Article 21 of the Rome Statute "bears the marks of the rush 
with which it was drafted and the process of compromise, which are ominous for its 
credibility.,,259 Whatever final conclusion on the merits of Article 21 of the Rome Statute 
one may reach, a critical examination of its theoretical underpinnings in light of the 
origins and development of international criminal law, reveals that it has significant 
ramifications for this emerging legal tradition. 
258 Pellet, supra note 200 at 1053. 
259 Ibid., at 1083. 
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As has been seen, the normative super-structure that it purports to transplant into the 
international criminallaw tradition differs in several important ways from earlier attempts 
to identify sources of law in this tradition. Article 21 of the Rome Statute removes the 
anchor of public international law that previously enabled international criminal law to 
develop, albeit with problems of its OWll. Article 21 differs in ways which will have an 
uncertain outcome on judicial decision-making in concrete cases, and threatens to 
undermine the rule of law by approving of different norms applying to different 
individuals. It also fails on a theoretical analysis to fulfill its aims of serving a gap filling 
function. The course of development of international criminal law before the ICC has 
been left to the discretion of the judges in many significant ways, despite formaI attempts 
to limit their powers to do so. The operation of Glenn's transnational common laws 
remains the dominant explanatory vehicle to explain how judges at the ICC willlikely 
address gaps in applicable law. 
From an institutional standpoint, the ICC as a permanent judicial institution charged with 
applying Article 21 of the Rome Statute has entrenched cleavages through the process of 
appointment and empanelling judges which formalizes the tension between enhancing 
humanitarian protection versus maximizing fairness to the accused. This tradition would 
benefit from a clear and honest debate about these competing tensions and how they 
affect outcomes in concrete cases. 
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International criminal law' s emergence in the wake of the darkest periods of human 
history has placed pressures on it that few other areas of law have had to endure. It was 
forced to hold trials in advance of a clear articulation of what law the judges hearing those 
trials were to apply. The legitimacy of such an exercise after WwrI faced serious 
challenges that have only resurfaced as Article 21 of the Rome Statute has attempted 
anew to refashion the normative structure underlying international criminallaw. These 
challenges include the need to transcend often divergent nationallaws within untested and 
ad hoc institutions. In many instances international criminal law is at the intersection of 
weIl established legal traditions, most notably the common law and civilian traditions. 
This thesis has demonstrated that these established traditions do not simply apply as 
sources of customary international law, but as transnational common laws that are 
persuasive, non-binding, and derived by judges of international criminal tribunals in a 
highly discretionary manner in difficult cases. The benefit of ad hoc institutions is that 
we can leam from them and adapt, such that new generations of institutions may be 
crafted and improved upon. A major drawback of the creation of a permanent 
international criminal court is that prospects for reform are likely to be less expedient as 
institution inertia sets in over the years. 
At the root of the discretionary selection by judges among the possible sources of norms 
is a competition between fundamental principles in the international criminal law 
tradition. On one hand, there is the need to enhance humanitarian protection to victims, an 
ideal embedded in international humanitarian law and particularly the Martens Clause. 
On the other hand, there is the aim of maximizing fairness to the accused, an ideal 
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enshrined in the growing body of international human rights law and codified in Article 
21(3) of the Rome Statute of the ICC. This contest of values has been the pivotaI tuming 
point in resolving legal issues before the modem ad hoc tribunals in several difficult cases 
where the traditional sources of law have failed to provide an answer. In sorne of these 
decisions, this dilemma has been laid bare in the reasoning of the judges, whereas in 
others it has been kept hidden from stated reasons. 
It is a finding of sorne significance that international criminal tribunals historically could 
not simply rely upon the general sources of public international law in resolving difficult 
cases. Even public internationallaw failed to pro vide a sufficient anchor to international 
criminal law. It is perhaps even more significant looking forward that Article 21 of the 
Rome Statute of the ICC ends the monopoly of these general sources of public 
internationallaw that were supposedly the foundation of the jurisprudence of the modem 
ad hoc tribunals, replacing it with a new normative regime that is highly variable and 
indeterminate. 
As has been shown on a theoretical basis, Article 21 of the Rome Statute and the 
institutional design of the ICC have not resolved fundamental tensions and challenges 
inherent in the international criminallaw tradition. Rather, they have exacerbated these 
ideological conflicts. Despite seeking to serve a gap filling function, Article 21 may fail 
to do so satisfactorily. While re-crafting the relationship between international criminal 
law and other national legal traditions, Article 21 serves to broaden the ability of judges 
to resort to transnational common laws. The ongoing development of international 
criminallaw is an open question due to Article 21 (2) of the Rome Statute, which leaves it 
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to the judges of the ICC to determine whether to adopt a system of non-binding 
precedence, or to opt for a dynamic jurisprudence which evolves in accordance with 
Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute to reflect changes in internationally recognized human 
rights. This means that until the ICC definitive1y and consistently articulates its position 
on the precedence of its decisions, the strength of the rule of law will be in doubt in its 
jurisprudence. Finally, the institutional design of the ICC only serves to deepen 
cleavages between the principles of enhancing humanitarian protection and ensuring 
fairness to the accused. 
These insights lead to are as for further research as the work of the ICC begins in earnest 
and the modem ad hoc tribunals move towards completion. In particular, while a 
theoretical examination of Article 21 of the Rome Statute has revealed the prospect that it 
falls short of an ability to fill gaps in difficult cases, this hypothesis remains to be 
examined on an empirical basis. The ability of Article 21 to succeed in meeting both of its 
animating justifications (Le. normative super-structure, and gap-fi1ling) requires an 
empirical analysis of representative 'test cases' in light of Article 21. Whether Article 21 
opens the door to resort to transnational common laws from an empirical perspective 
could also be considered in the se 'test cases'. This could involve a practical application 
of Article 21 of the Rome Statute to resolve the type of substantive, procedural and 
evidentiary questions that will like1y come before the ICC. This exercise of resolving 
representative 'test cases' by resorting to Article 21 could offer rich insights into the 
viability of this provision to provide a sufficient normative super-structure for the 
international criminallaw tradition. 
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A great deal of trust has been placed in international criminal law. There are high but 
sometimes shaken expectations in its ability to administer international justice in a fair 
and efficient manner, while being receptive to national laws as well as emerging 
international human rights standards. These aspirations will be better served if more 
attention is paid to the foundational aspects of this emerging legal tradition which has 
been given a degree of permanency in the ICC. 
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Statute of the International Court of Justice 
Article 38 
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such 
disputes as are submitted to it, shaH apply: 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting states; 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law. 
2. This provision shaH not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et 
bono, ifthe parties agree thereto.26o 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
Article 31 - General rule of interpretation 
1. A treaty shaH be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to 
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose. 
260 IC] Statute, supra note 31, art. 38. 
115 
Appendix 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shaH comprise, in addition 
to the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between aH the parties in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty; 
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the 
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related 
to the treaty. 
3. There shaH be taken into account, together with the context: 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the 
treaty or the application of its provisions; 
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
(c) any relevant mIes of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties. 
4. A special meaning shaH be given to a term if it is established that the parties so 
intended. 
Article 32 - Supplementary means of interpretation 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory 
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the 
meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when 
the interpretation according to article 31: 
116 
Appendix 
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable?61 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
Article 10 
Nothing in this Part shaH be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or 
developing rules of internationallaw for purposes other than this Statute. 
1. The Court shaH apply: 
* * * 
Article 21 
Applicable law 
(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence; 
(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and 
rules of international law, including the established principles of the international 
law of armed conflict; 
(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from nationallaws of 
legal systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States 
that would normaHy exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those 
principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and 
internationally recognized norms and standards. 
261 Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties, supra note 91, arts. 31-32. 
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2. The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted m its prevlOUS 
decisions. 
3. The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent 
with intemationally recognized human rights, and be without any adverse distinction 
founded on grounds such as gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, colour, 
language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, 
wealth, birth or other status?62 
262 ICC Statute, supra note 37, arts. 10,21. 
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